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Abstract
Reddy, R.K. Ph.D. The University of Memphis. August 2016. Emerging Market Strategies in
Advance Markets: A Two-Part Analysis of Home Country Influence. Major Professor: Ben L.
Kedia, Ph.D.
Large and bold acquisition attempts by emerging market firms (EMFs) have drawn the
attention of the business press and academic research alike. EMFs are successfully venturing into
industries that were previously dominated by select advanced market firms. In response,
international business (IB) research has attempted to understand the capabilities, behaviors and
motivations of emerging market firms. However, the general and specialized theories produced
by this research are not sufficient to explain all EMF behaviors.
The purpose of this dissertation is to present and test elements of an integrated theory
addressing the current theoretical shortfalls. Specifically, I integrate three specialized theories
with the OLI paradigm to explain the behavior of a larger set of EMFs. This integrated theory is
based on the idea that EMFs are not monolithic, but are heterogeneous due to their distinct home
country environments. That is, the state of home country institutional and resource environments
create unique opportunities and constraints for EMFs. Thus, EMF investments towards advanced
markets and specific behaviors are in response to their unique home country environments. The
theory is presented and tested in two parts.
Part 1, examines the influence of EMF home country institutional development and
resource endowments on the scale of outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) directed
towards advanced markets. Its findings suggest that the home country’s institutional
development, factor market development, capital market development and technological
readiness do indeed influence the volume of OFDI directed towards advanced markets by EMFs.
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In part 2, I argue that home country institutional quality, factor market development and
capital market development influence three forms of EMF behavior in advanced market firm
acquisitions- ownership concentration, target valuation and risk mitigation. The analysis of 4,161
EMF acquisitions in advanced markets largely supports the argument that the state of home
country environment influences EMF acquisition behaviors.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Focus and Importance of the Study
In 1981, Antonine Van Agtmael coined the term “Emerging Markets” to replace the term
“Third World Countries” to leave behind the stigma associated with the term and encourage
investments into these underdeveloped markets. The term “Emerging Markets” was chosen to
indicate “progress, uplift and dynamism” in these markets (Van Agtmael, 2007, p.5). And
indeed, emerging markets have become centers for global investments in the last few decades
(Sharma, 2012). Firms from emerging markets are also a growing force in the world economy in
the 20th century (Ramamurti & Singh, 2009). Whereas emerging market firms (EMFs) accounted
only for 5.6% of Global Fortune 500 firms in 1985, they now account for 30.2% of the Global
Fortune 500 list in 2014. In addition, leading emerging market firms (EMFs) like Tata, Embraer,
Huawei and Infosys are at the forefront of the economic news cycles and their aggressive and
unique internationalization approaches have defied existing assumptions on emerging markets.
Yet, it is difficult to explain the growing prominence of EMFs, because poor countries are
expected to import capital, including foreign direct investment (FDI), rather than export it.
While emerging markets are expected to go through years of inward FDI before
becoming prosperous and competitive enough to produce multinational enterprises (MNEs) of
their own (Dunning & Narula, 1997), emerging market firms are competing against traditional
MNEs (advanced market multinationals) and are increasingly finding success in most markets
(Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Ramamurti, 2012). This is against the conventional wisdom
because emerging markets while being poor and technologically backward, are producing MNEs
and changing the global competitive landscape, and challenging the status quo of existing market
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leaders from advanced markets. The question is how are emerging market firms achieving this
significant success?
In addition, international business theories predominantly developed to explain advanced
market firms are inadequate. They do not provide an explanation on how emerging markets are
spawning MNEs, why there is considerable internationalization of EMFs, nor what is the range
of behaviors of EMFs. Specifically, early theories of internationalization, like the Product life
cycle theory (Vernon, 1966, 1979) and Stages of internationalization (Johanson & Vahlne,
1977), not only fail to explain the internationalization of EMFs, but also suggest that EMFs are
not expected to internationalize, and that they are internationalizing in the wrong direction.
Consequently, the “OLI paradigm” (Dunning, 1988), the most significant and widely accepted
theory in IB, also currently fails to explain the existence of EMNEs, and the internationalization
behavior of EMFs.
Given traditional IB theories do not adequately explain the existence of EMNEs and their
unique internationalization behaviors, scholars have called for new theories to explain these
unique EMF behaviors. Addressing this call, a new set of theories have been put forward arguing
that “pull factors” (Fabian, Molina, & Labianca, 2009) can explain the behavior of EMNEs. For
example, Luo and Tung’s (2007) “springboard perspective” suggests that EMNEs
internationalize to seek ownership advantages, which they lack (Rugman, 2009). More
specifically, Mathews’ (2006) “linkage, leverage and learning framework” argues that EMNEs
internationalize using linkages to acquire strategic assets and ownership advantages from
external sources; to leverage networks to connect to partners and obtain strategic advantages;
and learning to upgrade utilizing existing capabilities via repetition and continuous
improvement.
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Though these new theories have been well received, some researchers believe that they
have little to offer and strongly advocate that prior theories can still explain EMF behavior (i.e.,
Dunning, Kim, & Park, 2008; Rugman, 2010). However, scholars like Cuervo- Cazurra (2012)
and Ramamurti (2009, 2012) take a middle path and argue that EMFs provide a context to
deepen our understanding and provide an opportunity to extend our existing theories. For
example, Rugman (2009) suggests that the internationalization of EMFs is a result of the
exploitation of their country-specific advantages like cheap labor and abundance of natural
resources. Ramamurti (2009, 2012) argues that an entirely different set of ownership advantages
possessed by EMFs, such as access to low cost, state-subsidized capital, can explain their
existence and their atypical internationalization trajectories. And finally, Cuervo-Cazurra (2012)
argues that country of origin effects explain EMF behavior.
In an effort to contribute to this ongoing debate and expand our understanding of EMF
internationalization trajectories and strategies, this research also adopts the middle ground
perspective, specifically building on Cuervo-Cazurra’s (2012) argument of country of origin
effects. The basic thesis driving this dissertation is that the heterogeneous nature of an EMFs’
home country institutional and resource environments explains the internationalization and
specific investment behaviors of its EMFs. Thus, the research question I address in the sections
that follow is: “How does the institutional and resource configuration of the home country
influence EMF internationalization trajectories and internationalization strategies?”
Approach to Address the Research Question
This dissertation addresses the research question in two parts. Part 1 focuses on how a
home country’s institutional and resource environment creates the necessity to develop market
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and non-market capabilities. Secondly, it delineates under what conditions EMFs are driven
towards advanced markets, as determined by the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
Part 2 focuses on how the home country’s institutional and resource factors determine the
behavior of EMFs in their AMF acquisitions. Specifically, this part focuses on ownership
concentration, target valuation and risk mitigation in EMF acquisitions. These proxies help
understand the motivation of the EMF, and specific acquisition behaviors.
This two-part approach addresses the research question in both a holistic, and a focused,
manner.
Purpose and Contributions of the Study
The goal is to first identify the home country factors that explain the internationalization
of EMFs to advanced markets, and second, to understand how and why the strategies and
behaviors adapted by EMFs differ from their advanced market firm (AMF) counterparts. I argue
that these internationalization trajectories and behaviors can be best explained by examining the
effects of the EMF’s home country institutional and resource configuration. In the process, I
attempt to extend IB theory building from the OLI paradigm and institutional theory -- while
simultaneously integrating the highly fragmented literature of the non-market capabilities, the
strategic asset seeking, and the refuge seeking perspectives -- by focusing on how the home
country institutional and resource environments influence the internationalization behavior of
emerging market firms.
I hope to contribute to international business and strategy literature by (1) advancing
existing theories to explain the internationalization behavior of AMFs and EMFs alike, while
integrating the non-market capabilities, strategic asset seeking and refuge seeking perspectives
with the OLI paradigm; (2) highlighting the significant differences in institutional and resource
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environments among emerging markets through explaining how the heterogeneity of institutional
and resource environments in home countries prompts distinct internationalization trajectories
and internationalization strategies; and (3) providing empirical evidence at both the country and
firm level to support my theoretical claims.
Format of the Study
Chapter 1 introduced the context of the study, the broad research question addressed
through the thesis, the importance of this thesis, and the main contributions of this thesis. The
following chapters are organized around the two studies examining country of origin factors: part
1 on the determinants of OFDI scale, and part 2 on the EMF internationalization strategies.
Specifically, Chapter 2 will review the relevant literature on internationalization, foreign
direct investments, and emerging market multinationals. Chapter 3 provides the theoretical
rationale of study one, and develops hypotheses which are well-grounded in theory. Chapter 4
offers the research methodology for part 1, including the sample, measures, and the choice of
statistical analysis methods. Chapter 5 will report on the results of part 1, presenting empirical
evidence on the role of home country factors in determining the scale of OFDI directed towards
advanced markets.
Next, Chapter 6 begins the second study, and will review relevant literature on cross
border acquisitions and emerging market multinational strategies. Chapter 7 discusses the
theoretical rationale of part 2, and develops theoretically grounded hypotheses. Chapter 8
presents the research methodology for part 2, which contains sample description, measures, and
choice of statistical analysis methods. Chapter 9 reports on the results of part 2, which presents
the empirical evidence on the role of home country institutional and resource environment in
determining EMF behavior.
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Chapter 10 will discuss the findings of both parts of the study. In addition, this chapter
discusses contributions and research implications. Furthermore, this chapter elaborates on
avenues for future research, based on findings of this two-part study.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review for Part One
Theories of Internationalization & Foreign Direct Investments
In 1980, 94% of total outward FDI stock was held within 12 advanced markets and the
top four contributors from those advanced markets accounted for 74% of the total outward FDI
stock. In accordance with this trend, early theories of internationalization like the Product Life
Cycle theory and the Behavioral Theory of the Uppsala School were put forth to explain the
internationalization process and international production of advanced market firms (AMFs). In
these early theories, internationalization refers to “an attitude of the firm towards foreign
activities or the actual carrying out of activates abroad” (Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975,
p.306).
First among these was Vernon’s (1966) product life cycle theory, later extended by Wells
(1972) and Vernon (1979). It suggests products are first developed in advanced market nations to
fulfill the demand of the consumers in domestic markets, and then exported to other advanced
markets. The products are standardized only after fulfilling the demands of advanced markets
resulting in lower prices. Subsequently, these standardized and low-priced products are then
exported to emerging markets, or the production is actually shifted to the emerging markets to
take advantage of the lower cost of production.
Along similar lines, Johanson and Wiedersheim-Paul (1975) put forth the Uppsala
internationalization theory, which was further extended by Johanson and Vahlne (1977, 1990,
2003). Also known as the behavioral theory of the Uppsala school, this theory suggests that
managers choose to internationalize to countries that are similar to their firm’s home country,
and further suggests that managers perceive similarity or dissimilarity based on the psychic
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distance between the home and host countries of operations. Moreover, in order to avert risk,
managers often choose to use a mode of entry that requires the lowest initial commitment of
resources, and then managers increase resource commitments only as they learn more about the
host country environment. Both the product life cycle and Uppsala internationalization theories
are normative frameworks, suggesting that firms and managers prefer incremental
internationalization, and that managers attempt to choose locations that are similar to their home
countries. However, these theories not only fail to explain EMF internationalization, but also
suggest that the directionality of internationalization is in reverse to what is found with EMFs.
In contrast to these earlier theories which focused on multinational enterprise (MNE)
internationalization, Dunning built a generalized framework that encompasses various
explanations for how the cross-border activities of a firm are value adding. This framework
popularly known as the OLI paradigm, or eclectic paradigm, is the mostly widely used theory in
international business research (Dunning, 1980, 1988). The OLI paradigm is a conceptual
framework that addresses positive rather than normative issues (Dunning & Lundan, 2008) and
states that “the extent, form, and pattern of international production are determined by
configuration of three sets of advantages” (Dunning, 1988, p.2). Dunning (1988) argues that
there are three tenets that act as sources of competitive advantage: ownership advantages,
location advantages and internationalization advantages. The first tenet, ownership (O)
advantages, refers to firm-specific proprietary assets such as well-recognized brands and
technologies. The second tenet, location advantages (L), refers to advantages accrued due to the
transfer of production to locations where the cost of production is lowest (Buckley, et al., 2007).
Finally, the third tenet, the internalization (I) advantage, refers to the benefits of bringing foreign
production within the firm internally rather than relying on a partnership agreement; the
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internalization of production usually reflects advantages from escaping a market failure, such as
the costs of moral and contractual hazards, government intervention, and controls on market
outlets (Dunning, 1981, 1988; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Ghoshal, 1987).
The eclectic/OLI paradigm in its original form fails to explain the internationalization of
EMFs. Its underlying assumption is that in order to internationalize, firms should possess some
firm-specific ownership advantages to exploit (Mathews, 2006). However, EMFs often lack any
of the described OLI advantages. In response, Matthews (2002, 2006) proposed the LLL theory
to extend the OLI paradigm to emerging market firms, relaxing the need for a firm to have
ownership advantages in favor of their ability to exploit linkage, leverage and learning (LLL)
advantages.
According to the LLL theory, firms from emerging markets pursue international
expansion in order to obtain new capabilities. In addition, this theory argues that a new
framework is required to understand asset exploration or asset augmentation by EMNEs.
Furthermore, Mathews asserts that EMFs have a strategic disadvantage due to late market entry,
often depriving them of assets that allow them to compete with traditional MNEs. Therefore, to
compensate for their late entry, EMFs adapt accelerated internationalization with the explicit
goal of gaining access to superior assets, resources, and/or advanced capabilities, which cannot
be accessed in their home countries. Additionally, the LLL framework explains three strategies
adopted by EMFs. First, EMFs establish links with traditional MNEs by offering services that
were not beneficial for traditional MNEs to internalize. Second, with the help of the links
established with traditional MNEs, EMFs acquire knowledge and competitive assets by
leveraging their existing complementary resources. Finally, repeating the linking and leveraging
process allows the EMFs to learn and helps them adapt and compete globally.
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Similar to Mathews (2002, 2006), Luo and Tung (2007) proposed the springboard
perspective highlighting the asset augmentation and asset seeking internationalization of EMFs.
First, this theory suggests that EMFs face disadvantages at home due to institutional and market
inefficiencies. Second, the internationalization of EMFs is a methodical and deliberate action to
facilitate firm growth, while establishing a competitive position in the global marketplace. Third,
the activities of EMFs are both repetitive and revolving. Repetitive, because M&A activities are
reoccurring. One M&A may improve one capability, while another M&A may improve a
completely different capability. Revolving, because EMNEs often integrate their internationallyacquired capabilities to the operations in their home country.
A related noteworthy stream of research arises from the proposed “refuge seeking,” or
escape, perspectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Witt & Lewin, 2007). These approaches argue
that the internationalization of firms is a response to conventional home country institutional
constraints (Grosse & Trevino, 1996; Thomas, & Grosse, 2001), such as barriers to domestic
investments, political and policy instability, and high taxes (Guar, Kuman, & Singh, 2014).
Recent research has also expanded to other home country limitations motivating escape, such as
technological deficiencies (Chen & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2012), barriers to new entry (Goldstein,
2009), or bias toward state-owned enterprises (Nguyen, Le, & Bryant, 2013).
Finally, a unique and compelling research stream may be termed the nonmarket
capabilities perspective (Bonardi, Holburn, & Bergh, 2006). Lecraw (1977) demonstrated how
certain firms from Thailand developed unique capabilities of managing and reducing risk
exposure derived from experiences in difficult institutional environments at home. In such
instances, the home country environment acted as a sort of furnace that led companies to
accumulate experience maneuvering institutions in other hard-to-manage environments. Cuervo-
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Cazzura and Genc (2008) extended this perspective of nonmarket capabilities by demonstrating
that EMFs indeed have unique advantages as compared to their advanced economy counterparts
when navigating in the least developed countries, ostensibly due to experience working with
weak institutions in their home country.
All of these internationalization theories are useful in understanding some aspects of
EMF internationalization, yet still fall short in rendering a holistic picture of EMF
internationalization. Specifically, the LLL and Springboard perspectives focus on asset or
capability augmentation alone, and ignore the important perspective of EMFs possessing nontraditional ownership advantages. In addition, the new theories of nonmarket capabilities and
refuge seeking, are not applicable to other traditional FDI motives like market seeking, natural
resource seeking and efficiency seeking motives. Nor are they applicable to non-traditional FDI
motives like escape motives, passive investments and support investments.
In the next section, building on existing theories, I provide theoretical arguments that will
extend the understanding of EMF internationalization behavior towards advanced markets.
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Chapter 3
Theory and Hypotheses Development
A country is governed by several formal and informal institutions (North, 1991). In
addition, a county is also endowed with several resources or factors that are accessible to firms in
the country (Luo & Wang, 2012; Wan, 2005). In this section, I attempt to explain how
institutions and the resource environment in the home country of emerging market firms will
determine the scale of foreign direct investments from emerging markets directed towards
advanced markets.
Institutions are the rules that regulate business behavior and shape the competitive
environment by influencing the costs of transactions in the market (North, 1991). As such,
institutions play a critical role in shaping firms’ business strategy and performance (Peng, Wang,
& Jiang, 2008). They affect firms’ motivation to produce, and the costs of contracting and
dispute resolution (Coase, 1992). While institutions influence transactional activities between
economic actors in the market, factor markets constitute another dimension of a country’s
environmental context that facilitates firms’ transformational activities (Wan, 2005). A country’s
resource environment or factors fall into one of three categories: 1) endowed factors, such as a
country’s natural resources; 2) advanced factors which consist of a country’s physical
infrastructure, capital and financial markets; and 3) human factors, such as the availability of
skilled and highly educated labor force, which can contribute to a country’s innovative capacity
(Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Factor markets are country-specific because different countries
“possess different natural endowments and create different technological and human capital
assets through the adoption of different policies and the following of idiosyncratic development
courses” (Kyrkilis & Pantelidis, 2003, p.827).
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Thus, environmental contexts in emerging economies in terms of their institutions and
resource environment are not homogenous (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2013; Wan,
2005; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Hoskisson et al. (2013) offered a typology of emerging
economies that classifies countries based on their institutional development and infrastructure
and factor market development. These economies are continuously undergoing changes and
hence, are at various stages along these dimensions (Wan, 2005). Hoskisson et al.’s (2013)
results confirm this conjecture and suggest that given the differences in environmental contexts
of emerging economies, the OFDI strategies that firms from these countries choose may also
vary.
Research in the FDI literature has mainly focused on identifying host country-specific
determinants of inward foreign direct investment (IFDI) (Bengoa & Sanchez-Robles, 2003;
Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Yeaple, 2003) thus examining the factors that make a host country
attractive as an FDI location. The literature on determinants of OFDI from emerging economies
has similarly emphasized the role of the host country environment (Buckley et al., 2007; Cheung
& Qian, 2009; Kolstad & Wiig, 2012) with less attention being paid to the EMF home country
context. For instance, Buckley et al. (2007) find that Chinese OFDI is attracted to countries that
are culturally proximate with high levels of political risk. Similarly, Kolstad and Wiig (2012)
find that Chinese OFDI is mainly directed toward large markets, and countries endowed with
large stocks of natural resources and underdeveloped institutions. On the other hand, Cheung and
Qian (2009) find significant effect of host country natural resource endowment but no effect of
institutions on Chinese OFDI.
Prior research on determinants of OFDI with an emphasis on the home country
environment has provided evidence of the important role of market size (Globerman & Shapiro,
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2003), income levels (proxy by GNP), exchange rates, human capital and openness of the
economy as determinants of OFDI (Kyrkilis & Pantelidis, 2003). However, Kyrkilis and
Pantelidis (2003) find that their model explains the OFDI of advanced market European
countries better than the OFDI of emerging economies (i.e., Brazil, South Korea, Singapore, and
Argentina) for they found fewer significant effects, and the relationships differed in direction and
strength across emerging economies. The hypothesized relationships on the role of home country
influence are presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Theoretical Model for Part One
Role of Home Country Institutional Quality
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North,
1991, p.5). In addition, they are the “rules of the game” in a country, and their evolution shapes
the economic development of the country as well as determines opportunities for its firms
(North, 1991, p.5). Firms’ conform to these institutions, which results in shaping the strategy and
performance of the firm in domestic as well as in foreign markets (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, &
14

Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). “Institutions directly determine
what arrows a firm has in its quiver as it struggles to formulate and implement strategy and to
create competitive advantage” (Ingram & Silverman, 2002, p.20).
In the last two decades much of the world, especially in emerging markets, has
experienced economic deregulation and institutional transformation (Pearson, 2005), which led
to economic development in emerging markets (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Wright et al., 2005). This
deregulation and economic liberalization in emerging markets has had an especially profound
impact on emerging market firms. First, economic liberalization increased market openness and
resulted in an increased inflow of foreign investments (Hitt, Li, & Worthington IV, 2005), which
led to increased competition in domestic markets. The new lack of preferential institutional
protection and increased competition from foreign firms -- which are often well-endowed with
firm specific ownership advantages in the form of world renowned brands, advanced technology,
and superior marketing and managerial capabilities (Hoskisson et al., 2000) -- leave emerging
market firms at a disadvantage and susceptible to failure. Second, in addition to deregulation and
the promotion of inward investments, governments in emerging markets have also become
known for promoting OFDI to maintain competitiveness and to foster growth (Fabian et al.,
2009; Rasiah, Gammeltoft, & Jiang, 2010). For example, research has demonstrated the role of
the Chinese government in promoting OFDI through the provision of capital (Wang, Hong,
Kafouros, & Wright, 2012) and political maneuvering (Xia, Ma, Lu, & Yiu, 2014). Third,
institutional development and deregulation have facilitated a wealth transfer to emerging markets
and led to economic prosperity and ensuing demand for better products (Hoskisson et al., 2000;
Pearson, 2005; Wright et al., 2005). Growing demand for luxury brands in countries like China
and India, for instance, is a testament to this effect.
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Therefore, as a nation’s institutional environment increasingly becomes deregulated and
sheds protectionism, there is an increasing pressure on domestic firms to seek strategic initiatives
to remain competitive in domestic markets and other emerging markets. As one such strategic
initiative, emerging market firms are increasingly adapting a foreign direct investment based
development strategy (Narula & Dunning, 2000), where emerging market firms are attempting to
augment assets, seek knowledge, and gain capabilities through OFDI (Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000;
Luo, 2003; Madhok, 1997) to advanced markets (AMs).
Thus, with the increasing development of institutions in home countries, growing foreign
competition at home, in conjunction with the growing demand for better products, emerging
market firms experience compelling forces to choose OFDI to AMs as a strategic initiative to
augment- assets, seek knowledge, and gain capabilities to adapt to the reforms in their home
country institutions. In addition, the growing promotion of OFDI policies by home-country
governments associated with pro-market reforms combine to drive EMFs with capabilities to
seek assets in advanced markets. Therefore, it is likely that there will continue to be a growing
trend of emerging market firms investing in advanced markets when there subsists notable
institutional development in their home country. Therefore, it is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 1a: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country quality of
economic institutions and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
Hypothesis 1b: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country quality of
regulatory institutions and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
Hypothesis 1c: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country quality of
political institutions and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
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Role of Home Country Factor Market Development
Factor markets are tangible resources that are available to a firm in a country’s
environment to produce goods and services (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). These factors include
physical infrastructure and quality human capital, that are recognized as key factors for a
country’s innovation and industrial productivity (Furman, Potter, & Stern, 2002; Porter & Stern,
2002). Therefore, home country factor markets play a significant role in the success of EMFs to
profit through economic opportunities like FDI (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Recognizing the
importance of much needed factor markets, some countries have begun investing significantly
into infrastructure, education and training, and research and development -- with South Korea,
Taiwan and Brazil as notable emerging markets that have taken this route (Wan, 2005).
Though some countries have started developing their own factor markets (e.g., South
Korea, Taiwan and Brazil) and other countries have pre-existing factor markets (e.g., Russia and
countries part of former Soviet Union), emerging markets are endowed with varying levels in
their factor market development and are hence heterogeneous with respect to this variable. In
response, firms in countries with a low level of factor market development tend to focus on
product capabilities, while firms in countries with munificent factor markets often focus on
innovation capabilities (Wan, 2005). Though the presence of well-developed factor markets
provide an advantage to firms and allow them to focus on the development of innovation
capabilities, these well-developed markets are accessible to all firms, both domestic and foreign,
and thus, do not provide firm-specific ownership advantages. Moreover, such munificent factor
markets attract foreign firms, who then attempt to capitalize on these location-specific
advantages enabled by the country’s factor market.
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Though the presence of munificent factor markets in a domestic market may not provide
firms with firm-specific advantages, the presence of foreign firms in a domestic market allows
the domestic firms to forge links with these foreign firms, leverage the munificent domestic
factor markets, and learn by repeatedly applying linking and leveraging with these firms from
advanced economies (Mathews, 2006). In addition, firms from countries with munificent factor
markets can also venture into advanced market nations to newly leverage their home country
advantages and learn from the firms in the advanced market nations through OFDI. In sum, the
presence of well-developed factor markets in the home country aids in developing innovation
capabilities with relative ease, while conversely, their absence would handicap firms in their
ability to learn and combine new knowledge. Therefore, it is likely that the degree of factor
market development in home countries will determine the propensity of emerging market firms
to venture into advanced countries either to learn or to leverage, and possibly further serve firms
or markets in these advanced countries, directly driving the scale of OFDI to advanced countries.
Hence, I hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: There is a linear and positive relationship between the home-country level of
factor market development and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
Role of Home Country Capital Market Development
Firms are not only subjects of their institutional environment and factor markets but they
are also subjects of capital markets and their influences. Capital market development is central in
guiding the investments of firms, because capital markets not only determine the availability and
cost of capital, but also the efficiency of capital allocation to value-creating investments
(Wrugler, 2000). Specifically, the quality of capital markets determines the efficiency with
which capital is allocated to investments creating high value and withdrawal of capital from
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investments yielding poor value (Bushman, Piotroski, & Smith, 2011). .Moreover, the level of
capital market development also determines the degree of minority shareholder protection (La
Porta, De-Salanes, Shelifer, & Vishny, 1997) as well as the degree to which investments are
directed towards creating shareholder value.
Capital markets are important for FDI for two reasons. First, capital markets determine
the availability of capital and the costs of capital. Second, capital markets also determine the
efficiency of capital allocation, where firms attempt to direct the available capital towards value
creation investments; e.g., FDI directed towards advanced nations. The presence of capital
market imperfections is acknowledged by IB as a field, and in particular, the presence of market
imperfections suggests market segmentation (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2008) across countries.
Assuming market segmentation implies that risk-adjusted capital costs differ across countries.
This variation in the cost of capital for foreign investments affects the present value of
investments and thereby, the profitability of investments (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2011).
Therefore, the ensuing low cost and high availability of capital as a byproduct of capital market
development provides distinct advantages to the firms originating from these economies.
Likewise, firms originating from countries with underdeveloped capital markets face difficulty
with the availability and cost of capital, putting firms originating from these economies at a
disadvantage. Home country governments in emerging markets with poorly developed capital
markets are known to provide low-cost capital assistance to firms investing in advanced markets
to maintain competitiveness of the country (Scott, 2002; Warner, Hong, & Xu, 2004) For
example, many Chinese firms’ receive significant advantages over other country firms as a result
of low-cost capital available through government assistance for OFDI (Buckley et al., 2010).
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Yet, the means of allocation is often very inefficient, and only a selected few firms tend to have
preferential access to such capital (Buckley et al., 2010).
Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the varying level of capital market development
in home countries of emerging markets will influence the volume of FDI directed towards
advanced nations, owing to the availability and cost of capital and how efficiently the capital is
allocated. Hence:
Hypothesis 3a: There is a linear and positive relationship between home-country capital market
quality and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
Hypothesis 3b: There is a linear and positive relationship between home-country capital market
size and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
Role of Home Country Technological Readiness
Technology is considered crucial in the industrialization and development of a nation.
Several studies have argued that technological progress plays a pivotal role in the sustained
economic development of a nation (Aghion & Howitt, 1992; Grossman & Helpman, 1991; Lee,
2001; Romer, 1990). The technological divide between advanced markets and emerging markets
is wide, however, recent trends indicate that emerging economies -- especially, China, Korea and
India -- are catching up with advanced markets; for example: China filed the highest number of
patent applications in 2013, surpassing both the United States and Japan, while Korea has
surpassed the European Union (World Intellectual Property Organization, 2013). In addition,
there is a growing presence of emerging market firms in technologically-intensive industries
(Alvarez & Marin, 2013), which indicates that emerging markets are bridging the gap and
attaining some technological advancement.
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The presence of emerging market firms in technologically intense industries is an output
of the transformation of their industrial structure and other factors influencing their technological
and commercial specialization; a process that is influenced by a more complex system tied to the
national innovation system and country environment (Narula & Wakelin, 1995). Specifically, the
transformation of the innovation system and technological environment is highly dependent on
the ability of a country and its firms to adapt available technology through an inward transfer in
the initial stages of industrialization (Mowery & Oxley, 1995). Historically, nations that have
indeed strengthened their ‘national absorptive capacity’ have benefited the most from inward
technological transfers (Mowery & Oxley, 1995, p.67).
The national absorptive capacity which is essential for technological adaptations by local
firms is dependent on countries’ technological readiness (Lee, 2001). FDI is considered to be a
main source of technological development for emerging markets (GCR, 2015). Accordingly, the
FDI literature attributes the growing technological advancement of emerging economies to either
inward FDI spillover (Sinani & Meyer, 2004) or strategic asset seeking FDI by emerging market
firms (Buckley, Cross, Tan, Liu, & Voss, 2008). The Springboard perspective (Luo & Tung,
2007) in particular recognizes that emerging market firms venture into advanced nations in
search of strategic assets like technology in order to integrate the acquired technology with
domestic operations.
Therefore, it could be argued that for emerging market firms to capitalize on
technological advancement through FDI, their home country’s technological readiness plays a
critical role. This technological readiness, based on the home country providing a sufficient level
of technological infrastructure, plays a pivotal role for emerging market firms who require the
infrastructure to support the integration of the technologies that were acquired from the advanced
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markets through OFDI. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that the degree to which a specific
emerging market will venture into an advanced nation through OFDI will be at least partly
dependent on its technological readiness. Hence, the hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: There is a linear and positive relationship between home-country technological
readiness and the scale of OFDI to advanced markets.
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Chapter 4
Research Methods
Data
The empirical data to test hypotheses 1 through 4 was based on an OFDI database
obtained for 60 emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013 list) during the years 2006-2012.
OFDI data was derived from UN bilateral FDI statistics published in 2014 by UNCTAD. The
analysis was confined to OFDI directed towards advanced markets. However, due to missing
data, only 48 emerging markets listed in Table 1 were used in the final analysis. Analysis was
performed using a sample of 208 observations. Home country environment data was obtained
from a variety of sources such as the Global Competiveness Index, World Bank-World
Development Indicators, Heritage foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, and the
International Country Risk Guide.
Measures
Dependent Variable. The dependent variable is outward foreign direct investment
(OFDI) to advanced market nations. Data pertaining to OFDI was obtained from the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development-Bilateral FDI Statistics. OFDI is measured as
yearly outflows of FDI to advanced market nations in millions of US Dollars. This data was
obtained for the years 2006 through 2012. To normalize the data, a log modular transformation
of OFDI was performed.
Independent Variables. There are four independent variables used in this study:
institutional development, factor market development, capital market development, and
technological readiness. Data pertaining to independent variables was obtained for the years
2006 through 2011.
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Table 1
List of Countries for OFDI Analysis
Argentina
Bangladesh
Botswana
Bosnia & Herzegovina
Brazil
Bulgaria
Chile
China
Colombia
Cote d’Ivoire
Croatia
Czech Republic
Egypt
Georgia
Ghana
Greece
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Israel
Jamaica
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kyrgyzstan
Macedonia

Malaysia
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Nigeria
Pakistan
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Saudi Arabia
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine

a. Institutional Development. In order to effectively capture the quality of the
institutional environment, data was drawn from a variety of sources, including Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, the International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk
Index and the Global Competitiveness Report.
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom consists of ten components of
institutions: business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment
freedom, financial freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, freedom from corruption, and
property rights. Each component is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 representing the
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poorest level of institutional development and 100 – the highest level of development. Five of the
ten components (business freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, investment freedom and
financial freedom) were considered.
The excluded components included government spending, labor freedom, and freedom
from corruption. The ‘government spending’ component which represents the “level of
government expenditures as a percentage of GDP” and zero government spending is considered
ideal and treated as a benchmark (The Heritage Foundation, 2015). The score on this component
is likely to be artificially high for countries included in our analysis, as the low GDP
denominator would overstate the investment amount by the government. The ‘labor freedom’
component, which concerns “minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoff, severance requirements,
and measurable regulatory restraints on hiring and hours worked” (The Heritage Foundation,
2015) was also excluded as it was weakly related or irrelevant to the construct of national
institutions that aid firms in OFDI expansion. The component of freedom from corruption was
better categorized under the political risk index rather than as an aiding institution, and was
excluded.
The International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk Index is built on 12 components,
which includes government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal
conflict, external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order,
ethnic tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. Four of these components
were identified as relevant to the construct of institutional development for firms
internationalization decisions: the investment profile, corruption, democratic accountability and
bureaucratic quality. The remaining components (socioeconomic conditions, internal conflict,
external conflict, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order and ethnic tensions) were
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dropped, because they reflect the political risk within a country and policy risk. The government
stability component was also dropped because this stability can be high for both autocratic
governments and stable democratic governments alike, and therefore does not truly reflect
political risk accurately. Variable component scales and sources are provided in Table 2.
Table 2
List of Variable Dimensions, Scales and Sources
Variable Dimensions
Scale
Source
Business Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Monetary Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Investment Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Financial Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Investment Profile
0-12
Political Risk Index
Democratic Accountability
0-6
Political Risk Index
Corruption
0-6
Political Risk Index
Bureaucracy Quality
0-4
Political Risk Index
Intellectual Property Protection
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Judicial Independence
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Burden of Government Regulations
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Efficacy of Legal Framework to Resolve 1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Disputes
Efficacy of Legal Framework to
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Challenge Regulations
Infrastructure
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Health and Primary Education
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Higher Education and Training
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Lending Interest rates
1-7
World Development Indicators
Market Capitalization
1-7
World Development Indicators
Stock Traded
1-7
World Development Indicators
Efficiency of Corporate Boards
1-7
World Development Indicators
Auditing and Reporting Standards
1-7
World Development Indicators
Strength of Investor Protection
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Minority Shareholder Protection
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Ease of Access to Loans
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Soundness of Banks
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Regulation of Security Exchange
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly Policies
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Note. Index of Economic Freedom is published by Heritage Foundation
Political Risk Index is published by International Country Risk Guide
Global Competiveness Report is published by World Economic Forum
World Development Indicators are published by World Bank.
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Global Competitiveness Report’s components of intellectual property rights, judicial
independence, burden of government regulations, efficacy of legal framework to resolve disputes
and efficacy of legal framework to challenge regulations. All non-redundant GCR components
reflecting institutional quality were included in constructing the measures of institutions.
To construct the measure of institutions, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was performed
with oblique rotation on the remaining fourteen components. Trade freedom and fiscal freedom
components were dropped after a preliminary EFA because of their heavy cross loadings. As
reported in Table 3, the final EFA produced a three factor solution with eigenvalues greater than
1.0 for all three factors and cumulative variance explained of 77.26%. The three factors captured
economic, regulatory and political institutions. Variable component scales and sources are
provided in Table 2.

Table 3
Factor Analysis Results for Institutions

Business freedom
Monetary freedom
Investment freedom
Financial freedom
Investment profile
Democratic accountability
Corruption
Bureaucracy quality
Intellectual property protection
Judicial Independence
Burden of government regulations
Efficacy of legal framework to resolve
disputes

Factor 1Economic
Institutions
.703
.723
.875
.869
.757
.435
.336
.474
.114
.513
.399
.202
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Factor 2Regulatory
Institutions
-.264
-.134
-.141
-.136
-.482
.322
-.344
-.102
-.812
-.714
-.825
-.949

Factor 3Political
Institutions
-.099
-.356
-.497
-.393
-.475
-.750
-.724
-.854
-.265
-.461
-.500
-.094

Table 3 (Continued)
Factor Analysis Results for Institutions
Factor 1Economic
Institutions
.264

Factor 2Regulatory
Institutions
-.943

Factor 3Political
Institutions
-.121

Efficacy of legal framework to
challenge regulations
Eigen Value
5.514
2.958
1.141
% Variance Explained
42.412
22.755
8.775
Cumulative% Variance Explained
42.412
65.167
77.258
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.806
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 1515.37; p <0.001
Note. n = 371. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads

b. Factor market development. Using the Global Competiveness Report’s data a measure
of factor markets was constructed based on the three pillars of Infrastructure, Health & Primary
Education, and Higher Education & Training. The measure reflects the original 2 pillar measure
introduced by Hoskisson et al. (2013). However, the third pillar was included to improve upon
the first two pillars used in the original measure. Each of these pillars were measured on a scale
of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the lowest factor development, while 7 indicates the highest form of
factor development. As reported in Table 4, EFA with oblique rotation resulted in a single factor
solution with eigenvalue greater than 1. All components loaded on a single factor, explaining a
total of 63.30% of variance.
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Table 4
Factor Analysis Results for Factor Markets
Factor 1: Factor Markets
Infrastructure
.873
Health and primary education
.834
Higher education and training
.946
Eigen Value
2.352
% Variance Explained
78.416
Cumulative% Variance Explained
78.416
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.633
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 681.939; p <.000
Note. n = 371. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads
c. Capital market development. In order to measure the level of capital market development,
twelve components were considered. These twelve components include lending interest, market
capitalization, stock market turnover, efficacy of corporate boards, auditing and reporting
standards, strength of investor protection, minority share holder protection, ease of access to
loans, soundness of banks, regulation of the security exchange, and effectiveness of antimonopoly policies. Since higher interest rates are associated with poorly developed capital
markets, the lending interest rate component was reverse-coded.
Definitions, measurement scales and sources of data are provided in Table 2. As reported
in Table 5, the EFA with oblique rotation resulted in a two factor solution with eigenvalues
greater than one. The two factor solution explained a cumulative variance of 64.78%. Lending
interest rate was the only component that did not have a factor loading greater than .7, while all
other components had loadings greater than .7 on either of the two factors. This led to two
dimensions of the capital market development construct: capital market quality and capital
market size.

29

Table 5
Factor Analysis Results for Capital Market Development
Factor 1Capital Market
Quality
Lending Interest rates(Rev Code)
.291
Market Capitalization
.137
Stock traded
.009
Efficacy of Corporate Boards
.786
Auditing and Reporting Standards
.917
Strength of investor protection
.426
Minority shareholder protection
.886
Ease of access to loans
.763
Soundness of banks
.809
Regulation of security exchange
.838
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly policies
.842
Eigen Value
5.187
% Variance Explained
47.154
Cumulative% Variance Explained
47.154
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.820
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 1785.284; p <.00
Note. n = 371. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads

Factor 2Capital
Market Size
.084
.966
.951
-367

-.410
-.564
-.308
.067
-.383
-.214
-.077
1.881
17.630
64.784

d. Technological readiness. This measure was obtained by using the Technological
Readiness pillar constructed by Global Competitiveness Report. This pillar measures technology
adoption and information and communication technology usage in a country. This measure was
measured using a scale of 1-7, where 1 indicates the lowest technological readiness, while 7
indicates the highest form of technological readiness.
Control Variable. Three country level variables were included as controls for the
analysis. (a) GDP growth rate is the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices. (b)
GDP per capita is the gross domestic product divided by midyear population. (c) Fuel exports
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are standard international trade classification (SITC) Section 3 mineral fuel exports as a
percentage of total merchandize exports of the country.
In addition, to avoid omitted variable bias, dummies were created for time periods and
the region of the emerging market. Dummies were constructed for the years 2006-2011,
excluding 2012 which served as the reference year. Dummies for four regions were created,
which included Africa, Asia, Europe and North America, with South America as the reference
region.
Statistical Analysis
To test for hypothesis 1a to 4, a panel regression was recommended owing to the panel
nature of data. To determine whether a fixed effects regression was more suitable than a random
effects regression, a Hausman test was conducted. The Hausman test resulted in an insignificant
Chi-square (p>0.05), which led to the rejection of the null hypothesis, thus a fixed effects
regression was inappropriate. Further, to evaluate the appropriateness of a random effects
regression over an ordinary least square regression in hypothesis testing, the Breusch and Pagan
Lagrangian multiplier test was performed. This test reported an insignificant chi-square
(p>0.05), which suggests that an OLS regression was the most suitable method of testing the
hypothesis for the given dataset.
To test the seven hypothesized relationships (H1a-4), an OLS regression was performed.
The first Model 1 OLS regression includes only the control variables. Model 2 includes the
control variables and the institutional development variables (economic, regulatory and political
institutions) were entered into the equation to test for hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c. In the next step,
(Model 3) I added factor market development, the next model (Model 4) I added the two
dimensions of capital markets (capital market quality and capital market size) to the existing
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equation, and finally, in Model 5 the technological readiness variable was included to the
equation.
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Chapter 5
Results
The descriptive statistics of mean and standard deviations, along with the bivariate
correlations for all variables, are reported in Table 6. All correlations were below the standard
cutoff limit of 0.7, except for three: GDP per capita and factor markets (r = 0.71), capital
market quality and capital market size (r = 0.76), and capital market quality and regulatory
institutions (r = 0.73) were all marginally above the standard cutoff limit of 0.7; a high
correlation is expected for panel data. Due to these correlations, special care (in the form of
multicollinearity diagnostics and separate regressions) was taken to monitor and observe the
adverse impact of high correlations between independent variables. However, the analyses are
not subject to multicollinearity. The variance inflation factors (VIF) were well below the
standard cutoff (VIF<10) limits.
Table 6
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Variable
FDI
GDP PC
GDP GR
FE
EI
RI
PI
FM
CMQ
CMS
TR

Mean
1992.59
9219.83
4.13
461.78
.01
.06
.12
4.47
4.38
.01
3.66

S.D.
228.88
508.69
.26
19.33
.43
.05
.05
.04
.03
.07
.05

Note.
GDP PC: GDP Per-capita
GDP GR: GDP growth rate
FE: Fuel Exports
EI: Economic Institutions
**
p < 0.01. *p < 0.05

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

.39**
−.06
−.11*
.08
.19**
.27**
.42**
.13**
.43**
−.07

.01
−.09
.49**
.27**
.58**
.71**
.37**
.02
−.12*

.58**
.10*
.17**
.05
−.13*
.08
.23
−.02

−.12*
.07
.01
−21**
−.09
−.03
−.04

.39**
.57**
.49**
.43**
−.22**
−.10*

.27**
.47**
.73**
.21**
.44**

.56**
.49**
−.10
−.21

.44**
.18*
.83**

.76
.46**

−.02

RI: Regulatory Institutions CMS: Capital Market Size
PI: Political Institutions
TR: Technological Readiness
FM: Factor Markets
CMQ: Capital Market Quality
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Table 7 presents the results of analyzing the effect of the home country environment on
scale of OFDI. Control variables along with region and year dummies were included in the
regression for model 1. Asia region (β = 0.23, p<0.01), GDP per capita (β = 0.41, p<0.01), and

Table 7
Results of OLS Regression
Variables

Model 1
β (std. errors)

Model 2
β (std. errors)

Model3
β (std. errors)

Constant
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
GDP growth rate
GDP per-capita
Fuel Exports
Econ Institutions
Regl. Institutions
Politic. Institutions
Factor Markets
Cap. Mkt Quality
Cap Mkt Size
Tech Readiness
R-squared

4.36 (.53)
−.04 (.52)
−.00 (.52)
−.00 (.51)
.02 (.51)
.01 (.52)
.01 (.52)
−.15 (.52)
.04* (.43)
−.26 (.42)
−.02 (.79)
−.01 (.00)
.52** (.00)
−.07 (.00)

4.64 (.57)
−.05 (.53)
.01 (.53)
.00 (.52)
.03 (.52)
−.03 (.51)
.01(.51)
−.06 (.62)
.04 (.47)
−.15† (.44)
−.00 (.78)
−.03 (.00)
.41** (.00)
−.09 (.00)
−.25** (.27)
.11 (.22)
.31** (.24)

.19 (1.80)
−.05 (.52)
.05 (.53)
.04 (.53)
.06 (.52)
−.03 (.51)
.01 (.51)
−.01 (.63)
.05 (.46)
−.17* (.44)
−.00 (.77)
−.02 (.00)
.29** (.00)
−.07 (.00)
−.25** (.27)
−.00 (.25)
.29** (.24)
.25 (.39)

.33

.36

.38

Adj. R Squared
F Stats

.29
10.35**

.32
8.60**

.34
8.69**

Note. **p < 0.01. * p < 0.05. † p <0.10
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fuel exports (β = −0.09, p<0.10) were significant, leading Model 1 with controls alone
explaining 29% of the variance (adj. R2 = 0.29). Model 2 explained 32% of variance (adj. R2 =
0.32), with the added three institutional development variables.

Table 7 (Continued)
Results of OLS Regression
Variables

Model 4
β (std. errors)

Model 5
β (std. errors)

Constant
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Africa
Asia
Europe
North America
GDP growth rate
GDP per-capita
Fuel Exports
Econ Institutions
Regl. Institutions
Politic. Institutions
Factor Markets
Cap. Mkt Quality
Cap Mkt Size
Tech Readiness
R-squared

.76 (3.19)
−.03 (.56)
.02 (.59)
.06 (.54)
.07 (.55)
−.03 (.53)
−.02 (.51)
−.06 (.67)
−.19† (.50)
−.18* (.49)
.00 (.81)
.03 (.05)
.26** (.00)
.01 (.00)
−.02** (.32)
.08 (.34)
.22* (.28)
.37** (.43)
−.06 (.49)
.24** (.14)
.47

.46 (3.19)
.06 (.63)
.08 (.62)
.12 (.56)
.09 (.55)
.01 (.53)
.01 (.51)
−.12 (.69)
−.25** (.51)
−.17† (.49)
.02 (.81)
.04 (.05)
.18† (.00)
.02 (.00)
−.32** (.35)
.09 (.33)
.16 † (.29)
.19 (.52)
−.06 (.49)
.23** (.14)
.35* (.52)
.49

Adj. R Squared
F Stats

.42
8.83**

.44
8.84**

Note. **p< 0.01. * p < 0.05. † p < 0.10

Economic institutions (β = −0.25, p<0.01) had a negative and significant effect opposite
to hypothesis 1a, while political institutions (β = 0.31, p<0.01) had a positive and significant
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effect, lending support to hypothesis 1c. Regulatory institutions (β = 0.11, p >0.05) had a
positive effect but was not significant at the .05 level, therefore hypothesis 1b was not supported.
Model 3 tested the effects of factor markets on OFDI Scale, and showed factor markets
have a positive and significant (β = 0.25, p<0.05) effect, supporting hypothesis 2, explaining
34% of variance (adj. R2 = 0.34). The effect of capital market development (capital market
quality and capital market size) was tested in Model 4, and these variables explained 42% of the
variance (adj. R2 = 0.42).

Capital market quality (β = −0.06, p>0.05) while negative was not

significant; capital market size (β = 0.24, p<0.01), on the other hand, had a positive and
significant effect. The last model, Model 5, explained 43.5%, (adj. R 2= 0.45) and showed that
technological readiness had a positive and significant effect β = 0.35, p<0.05) on the scale of
OFDI from the emerging market to advanced markets.
The discussion and implications of these results will be further covered in Chapter 10.
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Chapter 6
Literature Review for Part Two
EMFs often choose inorganic modes of foreign expansion including cross border
acquisitions (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, & Chitoor, 2010). In recent years, the acquisition behavior of
EMFs has attracted remarkable attention from the business press and academic research alike.
This attention is a product of “political inferences, media frenzy and nationalistic talks” both in
acquirer and target nations (Hope, Thomas, & Vyas, 2011, p.128). The interest may also be a
product of the aggressive bidding, location choice, relatively large acquisitions, and amount of
risk built into the deals undertaken by EMFs (Mathews, 2002, 2006; Luo & Rui, 2009; Luo &
Tung, 2007).
Equity-based entry modes via cross border M&As can entail partial acquisitions, where
the equity varies between 1 and 99% or full acquisitions, where 100% of equity is owned by an
acquirer, as in the case of wholly owned subsidiaries and full acquisitions, (Chari & Chang,
2009). Partial acquisitions have often been considered to be a form of joint ventures or equity
based alliance (Chen & Hennart, 2004; Das & Teng, 2000; Hennart, 1991; Inkpen, 2001) and
research attention has considered equity modes in joint ventures (Cuypers & Martin, 2009; Luo,
2001).
Chari and Chang (2009) suggests that understanding the determinants of equity
participation in cross-border acquisitions contribute significantly to our understanding of
decision making in internationalization. Specifically, equity participation has a significant
impact on risk, resource commitment, and return on investment for cross border acquisitions.
Earlier research into acquisitions indicated that the degree of risk and resource commitment
increases with increase in the share of equity in a venture (Erramilli & Rao, 1990). Other studies
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on equity ventures corroborated these claims of equity participation as an important indicator of
the amount of control assumed by the acquirer, the degree of resource commitment required, and
the degree of risk involved (Anderson & Gatignon, 1986; Brouthers, Brouthers, & Werner, 2003;
Luo, 2001).
Firms tend to reduce risk in unfamiliar foreign markets by lowering their amount of
equity participation and reducing the amount of resource commitment required (Folta, 1998).
Such actions reduce the costs of exiting the venture (Hill, Hwang, & Kim, 1990). Therefore,
firms choose to avert risk by choosing a lower level of equity when venturing into countries with
lower levels of institutional development (Jakobsen & Meyer, 2008). Conversely and in
accordance to Jakobsen and Meyer’s (2008) findings, Chun (2009) demonstrated that firms often
commit a higher level of equity when host countries provide higher levels of protection to
property rights in order to gain greater control of the acquisition. Furthermore, Luo (2001) found
that the amount of equity risk exposure is highly dependent on the host country environmental
dynamism, heterogeneity and hostility.
Other literature suggests that institutions and the institutional difference between home
and host country of acquisition matters significantly. In particular, the differences in formal
institutions and informal institutions between home and host countries often impact the choice of
entry mode or ownership structure during internationalization process (Demirbag, Galister, &
Tatoglu, 2007; Estrin, Baghdasaryan, & Meyer, 2009; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008).
Additionally, firms tend to lower their amount of equity commitment to cross-border acquisitions
due to increases in the liability of foreignness and endogenous uncertainty in the host countries
(De-Buele, Elia, & Piscitello, 2014). Consequently, increases in formal and informal institutional
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distances often encourage firms to pursue partial acquisitions as opposed to full acquisitions
(Contractor, Lahiri, Elango, & Kundu, 2014).
Extant research also suggests that the level of equity obtained and the degree of control in
a venture determines the ability of the acquirer to transfer tacit knowledge from the acquisition
(Chari & Chang, 2009; Das & Teng, 2000; Pisano, 1989) or protect knowledge it contributed to
the venture (Luo, 2001). The importance of protecting knowledge is also reflected by Chen and
Hennart (2004) who demonstrated that Japanese firms attempt to seek higher stakes when
acquiring US firms, to prevent ex-post opportunism of target firm managers through holding up
the tacit knowledge of the firm.
Information asymmetry and significant inefficiencies often set the stage for difficulties
with the valuation of targets and their resources in cross-border M&As (Moeller &
Schlingemann, 2007). Specifically owing to this information asymmetry and difficulties in
valuing targets, acquirers often find it difficult to complete the acquisition. When suitable
contractual and institutional remedies are unavailable, the potential benefits of acquisitions are
even more severely undermined by these irredeemable potential risks (Reuer, Shenkar, &
Ragozinno, 2004).
In cross border acquisitions where information asymmetry is a potential problem, the
bidding firm’s method of payment becomes indicative of its assessment of the target firm and its
resources (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Generally, when shares are used as a method of payment, it
signals that the bidder’s existing assets are overvalued; in contrast, when cash is used as the
medium of exchange, the acquirer assets are generally considered to be undervalued (Travlos,
1987). As a result, the market participants receive cash offers as the good news, while the
exchange of stock is viewed as bad news concerning the value of the bidding firm’s assets.
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Furthermore, research asserts that contingent payouts or stock payments as opposed to
cash purchased deals indicates that risk is shared with the target firm (Hansen, 1987; Martin,
1996). Hansen’s (1987) study suggested that acquirers tend to prefer contingent pay outs when
the target is overvalued as it is used as a method of risk mitigation (Chang, 1988). Stock
payments signal that the bidding firm management perceives potential risk and information
asymmetry -- possibly in combination with skepticism about potential synergies -- which results
in investors considering the acquisition risky (Schijven & Hitt, 2012) , and further resulting in
significant losses for bidding firms (Travlos, 1987). In addition, Fishman (1989) demonstrated
that target managements were more likely to reject acquisition attempts when bidders offered
stock bids, indicating in this case that target management is unwilling to share the risk. Agreeing
with the above Reuer et al. (2004) also argue that contingent payouts are often used as a method
of financing an acquisition to mitigate risk arising from information asymmetry and difficulties
in valuation of target firms. Additionally, they assert that contingent payouts are often a medium
of financing an acquisition in high-tech and service firms, owning to the difficulty in valuation of
target resources. Furthermore, they found that bidding firms’ acquisition experience reduces the
use of contingent payouts because of an increase in partnering capabilities, in conjunction with
hazard mitigation capabilities and information processing capabilities.
While cross border acquisitions are considered investments that are embedded with
significant risks that strongly motivate acquiring firms to pay as little as possible (Beckman &
Haunschild, 2002; Haunschild, 1994), research indicates that such acquiring firms on average
tend to pay 20-30% acquisition premiums (Laamanen, 2007). Accordingly, investors tend to
display negative reactions to these high premiums (Schijven & Hitt, 2012), likely due to strong
evidence that acquisition premiums negate the positive synergistic effects arising from
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acquisitions (Sirower, 1997). Interestingly, a limited number of studies do argue and find
evidence that the acquisition premium may in fact be positively related to synergistic gains
(Sirower, 1997; Slusky & Caves, 1991).
Managers must determine the premium they will pay, then, based on their valuation
placed on target assets, which reflects their assumptions about ensuing synergies. Home country
characteristics are likely associated with this managerial risk taking assessment. For instance,
Rossi & Volpin (2004) demonstrated that regulations in an acquiring firm’s home country, in
particular regarding accounting standards and shareholder protections, can affect managers’
willingness to engage in high risk choices, such as how they structure deals and whether to pay
high premiums for acquisitions. Conversely, Coffee (1999, 2002) provided evidence that target
shareholders in advanced markets will demand some level of premium for having their
investments moved under shareholder regimes in home countries with relatively poorer corporate
governance standards. In sum, EMFs end up paying higher premiums than firms from advanced
market home countries for their targets in advanced markets.
Despite these dynamics, emerging market firms have established their relevance to the
global acquisition markets by not only being attractive destinations for FDI, but more recently, as
substantial producers of global FDI. Importantly, the research has not offered much granularity
for differences in EMFs based on their home country. Rather, the literature has concentrated at
the more macro level status based on the advanced versus emerging dichotomy. Still, the
insights from theory based on this vantage point provide important suppositions for further
theory development at the individual country level.
The first relevant research stream I refer to here as the nonmarket capabilities
perspective (Bonardi, Holburn, & Bergh, 2006). Lecraw (1977) early demonstrated how certain
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firms from Thailand developed unique capabilities of managing and reducing risk exposure that
was derived from their experience in a difficult institutional environment at home. Here the
home country environment acted as a sort of furnace that led companies to gain experience
maneuvering institutions in other hard-to-manage environments. Cuervo-Cazzura and Genc
(2008) extended this perspective of nonmarket capabilities by demonstrating that EMFs indeed
have unique advantages as compared to their advanced economy counterparts due to capabilities
developed from experience working with weak institutions at home.
A second research stream informative to the impact of home country characteristics on
EMF investment can be derived from the strategic asset seeking perspective (Dunning, 1998).
Here, firms engage in FDI to acquire the assets of foreign firms that will promote their long term
strategic growth and sustain their global competitiveness (Dunning & Lundan, 2008, p.72).
Mathews (2002, 2006) further linked this tendency with country characteristics through his link,
learn and leverage perspective which noted that EMFs generally have a strategic disadvantage
owing to their late entry in the global marketplace, depriving them of competitive assets which
would allow them to compete with traditional MNEs. To compensate for this late entry EMFs
adapt accelerated internationalization to gain access to superior assets, resources, or advanced
capabilities, which cannot be accessed in their home countries. To gain access to these strategic
assets EMFs establish links with traditional MNEs by offering services that were not beneficial
for firms in advanced markets to internalize. Next, with the help of the links established with
advanced multinationals, EMFs acquire knowledge and competitive assets by leveraging their
existing complementary resources. Finally, repeating the linking and leveraging process allows
the EMFs to learn, helping them adapt and compete globally.
A similar perspective that builds on the strategic asset seeking motive is referred to as the
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springboard perspective (Luo & Tung, 2007) which explores both the asset augmentation and
asset seeking internationalization of EMFs. Critically, this theory draws on the fact that
emerging market firms often face disadvantages at home due to institutional and market
inefficiencies. Consequently, internationalization of EMFs represent a methodical and deliberate
action to facilitate firm growth, while establishing a competitive position in global market place.
Third, these movements toward FDI become repetitive and revolving. The repetitive aspect
captures that EMFs will repeat acquisition activities continually, however, one acquisition may
improve one capability while another acquisition may improve a completely different capability.
The revolving character captures the tendency for EMFs to integrate their acquired capabilities
with home country operations after each of their acquisitions.
A third perspective explaining EMF investment behaviors posits an escape imperative
from what Shleifer and Vishny (1998) memorably depicted as “the grabbing hand” of
government. While sparsely addressed in the IB and strategy literature until the recent synthesis
by Witt and Lewin (2007), current studies have been ramping up explorations of the escape
response motivated by conventional home country institutional constraints (Grosse & Trevino,
1996; Thomas & Grosse, 2001), such as barriers to domestic investments, political and policy
instability, and high taxes (Guar, Kuman, & Singh, 2014). Recent research has also expanded to
other deprivations motivating escape such as technological deficiencies (Chen & CuervoCazurra, 2012), barriers to new entry (Goldstein, 2009), or bias toward state-owned enterprises
(Nguyen, Le, & Bryant, 2013).
Though all three streams of research attempt to address EMFs cross-border investment
behavior, a certain degree of friction exists between these strands of research and each tends to
emphasize an emerging versus advanced dichotomy, consequently leading to treating emerging
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home countries rather homogenously. A theoretical synthesis of these existing perspectives in
relation to a particular acquisition process, here the premiums resulting from aggressive bidding
practices, can extend our understanding of EMF strategies and behavior.
Moreover, empirical follow up has similarly been limited to treating emerging market
home countries as homogenous entities. And exceptions, such as Thomas and Grosse, (2001),
have not looked at the unique condition of when EMFs enter an advanced country. Hoskisson et
al. (2013) convincingly demonstrated that these emerging markets vary significantly in their
institutional and resource environment. Further, the different levels of quality in the home
country’s institutional and resource environment will promote certain distinct investment
behaviors (Wan, 2005).
In the following section I extend insights from above to develop hypotheses linking home
country characteristics to the acquisition behaviors of EMFs in their advanced market
acquisitions.
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Chapter 7
Theory and Hypotheses Development
Role of Home Country Environment
Advanced markets are assumed to differ greatly from emerging economies in terms of
economic and institutional development (Ramamurti, 2004) and as such, they may constitute a
challenging environment for emerging market firms (Zaheer, 1995). Nevertheless, researchers
note that some EMFs tend to enter advanced markets before expanding into more similar host
countries (Ramamurti, 2012). In addition to these non-traditional choices of location and deal
structures, EMFs tend to value advanced market targets differently than advanced multinational
peers in the acquisition process, evidenced by aggressive bidding that results in unusually high
premiums (Hope et al., 2011).
Studying the risk-taking propensities of managers as they interact with particular decision
situations helps us understand firm behavior (Baird & Thomas 1985; Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar,
2013). A wide array of country characteristics are used to form managerial assessments; For
instance, managers develop knowledge and experience with political, regulatory, and trade
institutions; familiarity with factor quality in country resource environments; and understanding
of capital risk and currency trends. Such characteristics within a firm’s home country shape the
risk-taking proclivities of managers, and their incentives and understanding of the growth
opportunities available to their firms (Boubakri et al., 2013). Below I look at how the levels of
quality of each of these country characteristics are likely to uniquely motivate M&As by
domestic firms, and in return, impact the acquisition behaviors. The hypothesized relationships
are presented in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. Theoretical Model for Part Two

Role of Home Country Institutional Quality
Institutions serve as the rules that regulate business behavior and shape the competitive
environment, thus influencing the costs of transactions in the market (North, 1991). More
significantly, they affect firms’ motivation to produce via the costs of contracting and dispute
resolution (Coase, 1992). As such, country institutions play a critical role in shaping a firm’s
business strategy and performance (Peng et al., 2008).
Poor quality institutions tend to increase the hardships for firms through recurrent
government interferences, the absence of protection for intellectual property, and inefficient
contract enforceability (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Kalotay & Sulstarova, 2010). Specifically,
EMFs operating in countries with poorly developed institutions are subject to government policy
changes that directly or indirectly expropriate their assets or profits (Holburn & Zelner, 2010;
Korbin, 1979). Hence, firms operating in these environments must adapt by developing
nonmarket capabilities – i.e., corporate political activity to manage institutional actors (Hillman,
Keim, & Schuler, 2004; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016).
Prominent examples of such nonmarket capabilities include embedding themselves with
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political contributions, forming joint ventures with state owned enterprises, or placing politically
well-connected individuals on boards (Boubakri, Mansi, & Saffar, 2013). As a result, these
EMFs tend to avoid “political and contractual hazards” (Sun, Mellahi, &Thun, 2010, p.1161),
“discrimination, resource exclusion or expropriation or even sabotage” (Siegel, 2007, p.625), and
are just generally less sensitive to risk from host country institutions (Holburn & Zelner, 2010).
While embeddedness in political networks benefits firms in the short run and enhances their
performance, in the long run these firms perform poorly and are prone to operational inefficiency
due to the depreciation of ties and “unexpected political shocks” (Sun et al., 2010, p.1162).
EMFs operating in such predatory institutional environments are likely to attempt to
escape to operate in more efficient markets (Witt & Lewin, 2007). EMF managers will value
advanced market assets as incorporating lower risk and greater operational efficiency in the long
run than their own assets. In such cases, though managers will still value foreign assets at their
existing market value, their lack of experience will confine them to explore a smaller stake of
equity as passive investments. The lack of managerial experience to operate in high quality
institutional environment as in the case of advanced markets, combined with the lack of pressure
to develop market capabilities at home, will push EMF managers to seek a smaller stake of
equity in their AMF acquisitions.
However, in recent years, many emerging markets have focused on developing their
overall institutional quality (Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, & Peng, 2012) by adapting promarket reforms. Consequently, EMFs in these markets find their nonmarket capabilities of
decreased value (Sun et al., 2010), and are prompted to adapt and develop market capabilities
(Wan, 2005). Furthermore, an increase in institutional quality in a firm’s home country tends to
increase competition in domestic markets through both domestic and foreign new entry (Luo &
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Wang, 2012).
Thus, EMFs are increasingly forced to adapt and learn market capabilities in home
countries with higher levels of institutional quality. However, because they often possess
minimal such capabilities, EMFs find they are at a competitive disadvantage to their advanced
multinational counterparts. Acquiring direct access to advanced market target firm capabilities
provides an important channel for EMFs to learn how overcome their disadvantages at home
while gaining access to new markets. Managers in these EMFs foresee considerable synergistic
value in enhanced transaction efficiency, new market access, and capabilities that can be
combined with home country advantages. Since, acquirers need a majority stake to transfer the
capabilities to their home country and combine newly acquired capabilities with home country
advantages, EMFs from emerging markets with highly developed institutional environments tend
to seek a higher stake of equity (to assume control of target assets and capabilities), and also
favor a full acquisition as opposed to partial acquisitions; EMFs originating from poor quality
institutional environment seek a smaller stake of equity in advanced market acquisitions Hence:
Hypothesis 5a: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home
country’s political institutions and the amount of equity sought by an EMF in and AMF
acquisition.
Hypothesis 5b: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home
country’s regulatory institutions and amount of equity sought by an EMF in and AMF
acquisition.
Hypothesis 5c: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of home country’s
trade institutions and the amount of equity sought by an EMF in and AMF acquisition.
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It could be argued that the quality of the home country institutions of EMFs will also
affect the valuation of foreign assets in advanced markets. While EMFs originating from
countries with poorly developed institutional environment value foreign assets based on the
efficiency of transaction, and future cash flows from investment; EMFs originating from better
institutional environments not only value foreign assets based on the efficiency of transactions in
advanced market operations, but also by the added value gained by acquiring market capabilities
and the synergistic benefits gained when the acquired capabilities are combined with home
country advantages.
EMFs operating in countries with poorly developed institutional environments are
subjected to the risk of their governments opportunistically altering their policies to directly or
indirectly expropriate the firm’s assets or profits (Holburn & Zelner, 2010; Korbin, 1978).
Therefore, it may be argued that acquisitions of AMFs only serve as a safe harbor to investments
of EMFs originating from poor quality institutional environments. But for those EMFs
originating from a better quality institutional environment, the potential to learn and incorporate
sophisticated market capabilities provides unique additional value. Thus, advanced market
acquisition targets are of greater value than for their advanced market firm counterparts which
already hold sophisticated market capabilities, and of greater value than for their EMF
counterparts who do not aspire gain these capabilities into their domestic operations. Therefore,
EMFs from countries with superior formal institutions are likely to gain additional value from
AMF market and non-market capabilities, and thus the hypotheses:
Hypothesis 6a: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home
country’s political institutions and the acquisition premium offered by an EMF in an AMF
acquisition.
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Hypothesis 6b: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home
country’s regulatory institutions and the acquisition premium offered by an EMF in an AMF
acquisition.
Hypothesis 6c: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home
country’s trade institutions and the acquisition premium offered by an EMF in an AMF
acquisition.
The influence of the home country institutional quality will also have an effect on another
aspect of acquisitions, i.e., the method of payment. Acquisitions are bound by information
asymmetry, and a contingent method of payments, where the acquirer uses its own stock as part
of the offer, are regularly used to reduce the risk owing to information asymmetry (Reuer et al.,
(2004). However, a contingent method of payments will also reduce the ability of the acquirer to
draw favorable contractual terms with the target firm. Moreover, the likelihood of target
managers accepting a contingent method of payment decreases when the acquirer stock is
associated with higher risk (Reuer et al., (2004).
EMFs originating from countries with poor quality institutional environments tend to face
greater risk; this high amount of risk is embedded in the acquirer stock, and generally motivates
acquirers to rely on all cash methods of payment as opposed contingent methods of payment.
Conversely, EMFs originating from higher quality institutional environments are more sensitive
to risk, and therefore, often opt for contingent methods of payment. Furthermore, the value of the
advanced market targets lies in the ability of EMF to transfer the capabilities and integrate the
resources with home operations and therefore, the contingent methods of payments can also be
used to tie the integration to the performance. Therefore, the likelihood of EMFs using a
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contingent payment mode increases with an increase in the quality of home country institutional
environments. Hence, the hypotheses
Hypothesis 7a: There is a positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s
political institutions and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF in
an AMF acquisition.
Hypothesis 7b: There is a positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s
regulatory institutions and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF
in an AMF acquisition.
Hypothesis 7c: The positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s trade
institutions and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF in an AMF
acquisition.
Role of Home Country Factor Market Development
Firms are not only highly subject to the demands of the institutional environment that
they operate in, but they also incorporate the opportunities available in their country’s factor
market resources. These factor markets are the tangible resources in a country that are available
to produce goods and services (Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). Factor markets include therefore both
physical infrastructure and quality human capital as key to supporting a country’s innovation and
industrial productivity (Furman, Potter, & Stern, 2002; Porter & Stern, 2002).
Home country factor markets play a significant role in the success of emerging market
firms to profit through economic opportunities (Hoskisson et al., 2013). Emerging market
countries vary widely in their levels of factor market quality, which in turn strongly determines
firm options in serving specific aspects of the industrial value chain. More particularly, firms in
countries with low factor market quality tend to focus on production capabilities, while firms in
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countries with munificent factor markets are better able to focus on innovation capabilities (Wan,
2005).
Factor market quality is likely to contribute to the ability for advanced market assets to
serve as strategic assets for an EMF firm. EMFs originating from countries with poorly
developed factor markets are likely to find limited synergistic value for advanced market assets.
On the other hand, EMFs whose home countries support more munificent factor markets will
assess greater opportunities to develop synergies and increase their profitability. Sophisticated
organizational mechanisms that are correlated with higher human capital quality are essential for
transferring acquired target competencies, knowledge and/or technology to the home firm
(Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2005) such that firms with better factor markets are likely
to have a higher ability for absorptive capacity. By combining advanced market competencies
with the advantages of a more munificent factor market at home, EMFs may also be able to
become more competitive in their home countries, and possibly better serve other advanced
markets through acquired advanced target assets.
In sum, firms in countries with higher quality factor markets will be more able to exploit
the advantages associated with the strategic asset seeking perspective than their less factorendowed peers. Specifically, EMFs in poorer factor markets, while possibly able to increase the
network of advanced market firms they serve by acquiring a network member, will most likely
not be able to transfer the higher value chain activities of their target acquisition back to their
home country.
Firms from emerging markets with less munificent factor markets at home will attempt to
acquire firms in advanced markets to access AMF networks in order to gain further access to
markets, as opposed to attempting to transfer and integrate target firm capabilities with home
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country operations. Therefore, such EMFs will attempt to seek a smaller share of equity. On the
other hand, firms originating from emerging markets with well-endowed factor markets will
attempt to assume a controlling stake or full equity to facilitate the transfer and integration of
AMF capabilities with home country operations. Hence the hypothesis
Hypothesis 8: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home
country’s factor markets and the amount of equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.
Conversely increases in factor market quality at home should mean that EMFs have a
greater propensity to generate unique synergies, which means that the target assets are more
valuable to firms originating from emerging markets with greater factor market munificence and
will consequently offer higher bid premiums for acquiring advanced market firms, leading to the
following:
Hypothesis 9: There is a linear and positive relationship between the quality of the home
country’s factor markets and the acquisition premium by an EMF in and AMF acquisition.
In acquiring an AMF, the EMF originating from a country with munificent factor markets
not only has a greater potential to generate synergies in combination with AMF, but it is also
exposed to a higher inherent risk of failure due to the complex nature of operations and
complexity in combining the assets. Since there is a potential risk of not realizing expected
synergies, such EMFs are likely to engage in using contingent methods of payment instead of
simple all cash bids. In addition, there is a greater likelihood of target management accepting
these contingent methods of payment, due to the greater potential for synergies and abilities to
generate future cash flows. Hence the hypothesis
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Hypothesis 10: There is positive relationship between the quality of the home country’s factor
markets and the probability of using a contingent method of payment by an EMF in an AMF
acquisition.
Role of Home Country Capital Market Development
In addition to resources from factor markets, financial resources play a critical role in the
investment choices firms face. Capital market development represents the constraints,
availability, and costs of capital to a firm in a given market (Forssbaeck & Oxelheim, 2011), and
incorporating this variable strongly enriches our understanding of the internationalization of
firms (Oxelheim, Randøy, & Stonehill, 2001). Capital market development influences the
efficiency of capital allocation in regard to directing capital towards investments with greater
potential (La Porta et al., 1997; Wrugler, 2000). In addition, shareholder protections and antidirectorial rights are a hallmark of well-developed capital markets (La porta et al., 1998; Rossi &
Volpin, 2004).
Differences in the quality of capital markets can explain an EMF’s approach to
acquisitions and the premiums they will risk to access acquisitions in more stable advanced
markets. Capital flight is one of many motives for FDI to high quality capital markets (Coffee,
1999; 2002), based on the idea that firms seek to escape home country capital markets that are
deficient in the availability and cost of capital, while often encumbering government
involvement and minimal guarantees of shareholder rights. EMFs may therefore aim to access
advanced country capital markets for their low cost of capital (Coffee, 1999; 2002), and commit
themselves to more stringent corporate governance standards through advanced market
acquisitions (Hope et al., 2011).
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EMFs attempting to associate with a more developed capital market through an advanced
market acquisition, either to access low cost capital or to subject themselves to more stringent
corporate governance standards, will attempt to acquire a smaller stake of equity in order to
avoid the risk of failure and at the same time to gain access to more developed capital markets.
EMFs from well-developed capital markets attempt to acquire target firms to gain access to
target resources and capabilities, and to integrate them with home operations, will seek a higher
stake of equity in the target firm. Hence the hypotheses
Hypothesis 11a: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market
quality and equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.
Hypothesis 11b: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market size
and equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.
Hypothesis 11c: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s cost of capital and
equity sought by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.
Furthermore, some EMFs in especially poor functioning capital markets will also be
better able to afford their acquisitions and accompanying acquisition premiums than EMFs in
countries with better quality capital markets. While the market rates in poorly developed
financial markets can be higher, imperfections in these markets often allow some firms to obtain
capital at below-market rates, as in the case of state-owned enterprises in China (Lardy, 1998;
Warner et al., 2004) and other nations. Similarly, an associated faulty banking system may
facilitate soft loans to EMFs for their FDI based on inefficiencies in the banking system or as a
result of government policy (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Antkiewicz & Whalley, 2006). EMFs are
then able to finance their advanced market acquisition with capital at below market rates, thereby
compensating for the higher premiums paid.
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Finally, the absence of private shareholders, minority shareholder protection, and the
absence of anti-directorial rights in EMF firms from poor quality market may result in overbidding (Rossi & Volpin, 2004) as these mechanisms serve as important checks on managerial
hubris. Moreover, as the home country’s capital market quality increases, the value of accessing
capital at lower cost or of greater stability in advanced market diminishes. Unlike access to
market capabilities and strategic assets, which increase in value as the gap between advanced and
emerging markets lessens, lower capital market quality gaps translate to lower advantages for
EMF firms.
Given all of the above, I hypothesize.
Hypothesis 12a: There is a negative relationship between the home country’s capital market
quality and the acquisition premium by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.
Hypothesis 12b: There is a negative relationship between the home country’s capital market
size and the acquisition premium by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.
Hypothesis 12c: There is a negative relationship between the home country’s cost of capital and
the acquisition premium by an EMF in an AMF acquisition.
Since the method of payments can be used as an instrument for mitigating risk in
acquisitions, firms engaging in acquisitions with complex goals and more risky operations often
adopt a contingent method of payment (Reuer et al., 2007). When the goal of an EMF is to
acquire and transfer target firm resources and capabilities, they are undertaking complex
operations with a high risk of failure, hence there is a greater likelihood of employing such risk
mitigation strategies. In addition, the ability of shareholders to restrain risk taking behaviors in
well-developed capital markets will push managers to adapt more risk mitigating strategies. In
order to mitigate risk, firms from emerging markets with high levels of capital market
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development are more likely to use contingent payment methods. On the contrary, firms from
emerging markets with poorly developed capital markets with goal of accessing well-developed
capital markets are more tolerant to risk and are less restrained by shareholder activism, hence
such EMFs are more likely to use cash as method of payment. Therefore, I hypothesize
Hypothesis 13a: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market
quality and the probability of the EMF using a contingent method of payment in an AMF
acquisition.
Hypothesis 13b: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s capital market size
and the probability of the EMF using a contingent method of payment in an AMF acquisition.
Hypothesis 13c: There is a positive relationship between the home country’s cost of capital and
the probability of the EMF using contingent method of payment in an AMF acquisition.
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Chapter 8
Research Methods
Sample
The empirical analysis to test hypotheses 5a-13c is based on cross border mergers &
acquisitions (M&A) data obtained for 60 emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2013 list)
during the years 2006-2015. However, due to the missing data only 48 emerging markets listed
in Table 8 were used in the final analysis.

Table 8
List of Acquirer Countries
Argentina (18)
Mexico (89)
Azerbaijan (5)
Morocco (3)
Botswana (3)
Nigeria ( 7)
Brazil (90)
Pakistan (2)
Bulgaria (5)
Peru (16)
Chile (28)
Philippines (57)
China (1365)
Poland (81)
Colombia (18)
Portugal (60)
Croatia (1)
Romania (5)
Czech Republic (14)
Russia (167)
Egypt (25)
Saudi Arabia (28)
Estonia (2)
Slovakia (6)
Georgia (1)
Slovenia (2)
Greece (48)
South Africa (164)
Hungary (8)
South Korea (405)
India (457)
Taiwan (170)
Indonesia (60)
Thailand (75)
Israel (257)
Trinidad & Tobago (1)
Jamaica (5)
Tunisia (1)
Jordan (3)
Turkey (36)
Kazakhstan( 7)
Ukraine (14)
Kenya (1)
Venezuela (2)
Latvia (1)
Lithuania (4)
Malaysia (305)
Mauritius (39)
Note. n = 4161. Number of acquisitions from each country in parenthesis
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The M&A transaction data was obtained from Thomson Financial SDC Platinum
database. Specifically, the analysis was restricted to M&A transactions with target firms located
in advanced markets. Thomson Financial SDC Platinum data is the source of M&A data for
many M&A research studies in international business and strategy research. The home country
environment data was obtained from a variety of sources such as the Global Competiveness
Index, World Bank- World Development Indicators, Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic
Freedom and International Country Risk Guide.
Measures
Dependent Variables. Three dependent variables were used in the analysis. The
definition and data sources for each are as follows:
Acquisition Premium is the overpayment over and above the value of the target firm,
measured as a percentage of difference in price paid by the acquirer and the target’s preacquisition stock price (one week before announcement) (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara,
Carpenter, & Davison, 2009). Thompson Financial SDC Platinum is the source of data.
Equity Sought is a percentage of shares in the acquisition that the acquirer chooses to
acquire through the specific transaction under observation (Chari & Chang, 209). The value
ranges between 0 and 100%. The data pertaining to equity sought was also obtained from
Thompson Financial SDC platinum.
Mode of Payment is a dichotomous variable for the method of payment used for the
acquisition. The acquirer either chooses to use a cash bid, or an equity bid (including a mix of
both). If the acquirer uses any stock as a method of payment, then I considered it as contingent
method of payment and assigned a value of 1. Alternatively if only cash was used as mode of
payment, then it was assigned a value of 0.
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Independent Variables. There are three independent variable used in this study. The
data pertaining to independent variables was obtained for the years 2006 through 2015.
a. Institutions. In order to effectively capture the quality of the institutional
environment, data was drawn from a variety of sources. The sources include the Heritage
Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk
Index, and the Global Competitiveness Report.
The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom captures data for ten
institutional components: business freedom, labor freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom,
investment freedom, financial freedom, fiscal freedom, government spending, freedom from
corruption, and property rights. Each component is measured on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0
representing the poorest level of institutional development and 100 – the highest level of
development. Six of the ten components (business freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom,
investment freedom, financial freedom, and property rights) were considered. A few components
of this index were excluded including labor freedom, government spending and freedom from
corruption. The ‘government spending’ component represents the level of government
expenditures as a percentage of GDP and zero government spending is considered ideal and
treated as a benchmark (The Heritage Foundation, 2015). The score on this component is likely
to be artificially high for countries included in our analysis, since their governments are likely to
have low GDPs which quickly makes even low spending a high percentage. Therefore, the
government spending component was excluded. The ‘labor freedom’ component, which
concerns minimum wages, laws inhibiting layoff, severance requirements, and measurable
regulatory restraints on hiring and hours worked (The Heritage Foundation, 2015) was excluded
because, this component represents less relevant to our analysis aspect of institutions. Since, the
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component of ‘freedom from corruption’ was also considered in the political risk index, I
excluded this component.
International Country Risk Guide’s Political Risk Index is built on twelve components,
including: government stability, socioeconomic conditions, investment profile, internal conflict,
external conflict, corruption, military in politics, religion in politics, law and order, ethnic
tensions, democratic accountability and bureaucratic quality. The seven components of
socioeconomic conditions, internal conflict, external conflict, military in politics, religion in
politics, law and order and ethnic tensions were dropped, because they reflect the political and
policy risk within a country. The government stability component was also dropped because this
component only reflects the stability and can be high for both autocratic governments and stable
democratic governments alike, and therefore does not truly reflect policy risk accurately.
The Global Competitiveness Report’s includes the components of intellectual property
rights, judicial independence, burden of government regulations, efficacy of legal framework to
resolve disputes and efficacy of legal framework to challenge regulations. All non-redundant
GCR components reflecting institutional quality were included in constructing the measures of
institutions. Definitions, scales and sources are provided in Table 9.
To construct the measure of institutions, an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was
performed with oblique rotation on the remaining fourteen components. Fiscal freedom
components were dropped after preliminary EFA because of heavy cross loadings. As reported in
Table 10, the final EFA produced a three factor solution with eigenvalues greater than 1.0. Three
factor solutions explained cumulative variance 77.23%. The three factors captured represent
political, regulatory and trade institutions. Property rights, investment freedom, financial
freedom, investment profile, democratic accountability, corruption, and bureaucratic quality
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Table 9
List of Variable Dimensions, Scales and Sources
Variable Dimensions
Scale
Source
Property Rights
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Business Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Monetary Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Trade Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Investment Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Financial Freedom
0-100 Index of Economic Freedom
Investment Profile
0-12
Political Risk Index
Democratic Accountability
0-6
Political Risk Index
Corruption
0-6
Political Risk Index
Bureaucracy Quality
0-4
Political Risk Index
Intellectual Property Protection
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Judicial Independence
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Burden of Government Regulations
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Efficacy of Legal Framework to Resolve
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Disputes
Efficacy of Legal Framework to Challenge
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Regulations
Infrastructure
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Health and Primary Education
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Higher Education and Training
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Lending Interest rates
1-100 World Development Indicators
Market Capitalization
World Development Indicators
Stock Traded
World Development Indicators
Efficiency of Corporate Boards
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Auditing and Reporting Standards
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Strength of Investor Protection
1-10
Global Competiveness Report
Minority Shareholder Protection
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Ease of Access to Loans
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Soundness of Banks
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Regulation of Security Exchange
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly Policies
1-7
Global Competiveness Report
Note.
Index of Economic Freedom is published by Heritage Foundation
Political Risk Index is published by International Country Risk Guide
Global Competiveness Report is published by World Economic Forum
World Development Indicators are published by World Bank.
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loaded heavily on the factor 1 representing political institutions. Bureaucratic quality had the
lowest loading of 0.80 and property rights had the highest loading of 0.97 on political institutions
factor. None of these components presented any significant cross loadings.

Table 10
Factor Analysis Results for Institutions
Factor 1Political
Institutions
.967
.686
.534
.259
.910
.814
.836
.901
.803
.796
.446
.548
−.068

Factor 2Factor 3Regulatory
Trade
Institutions Institutions
.108
.282
−.020
.665
.309
.652
.063
.816
−.024
.452
−.126
.465
.057
.326
−.020
−.045
.308
.189
.194
.287
.468
.725
.038
.727
.105
.898

Property rights
Business freedom
Monetary freedom
Trade freedom
Investment freedom
Financial freedom
Investment profile
Democratic accountability
Corruption
Bureaucracy quality
Intellectual property protection
Judicial Independence
Efficacy of legal framework to resolve
disputes
Efficacy of legal framework to challenge
.028
.873
regulations
Burden of government regulations
−.383
.632
Eigen Value
7.030
3.122
% Variance Explained
46.865
20.811
Cumulative% Variance Explained
46.865
67.676
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.841
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 41254.54; p <0.01
Note. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads

−.004
.404
1.441
9.609
77.258

Intellectual property protection, judicial independence, efficacy of legal framework to
resolve disputes, efficacy of legal framework to challenge regulations loaded heavily on factor 2
representing regulatory institutions. Intellectual property protection had the smallest loading of

63

0.73 and efficacy of legal framework to resolve disputes had the highest loading of 0.90. None of
these factors presented any significant cross loadings and explained 20.81% of variance.
Trade freedom alone loaded on factor 3 representing trade institutions and presented no
significant cross loadings. Trade freedom had a loading of 0.82 and this factor explained 9.61%
of variance.
b. Factor Markets- Using Global Competiveness Report’s data a measure of factor
markets was constructed based on three pillars that are Infrastructure, Health & Primary
Education, and Higher Education & Training. This measure was constructed based on 2 pillar
measure introduced by Hoskisson et al. (2013). However, a third pillar was included in addition
the first two pillars used in the original measure. Each of these pillars were measured on a scale
of 1 to 7, where 1 indicates the lowest factor development, while 7 indicates the highest form of
factor development. As reported in Table 11, EFA with oblique rotation resulted in a single
factor solution with eigenvalue greater than 1. All components loaded on a single factor,
explaining a total of 79.83% of variance. Health and primary education had the smallest loading
of 0.85 and infrastructure had the highest loading of 0.92.

Table 11
Factor Analysis Results for Factor Markets
Factor 1: Factor Markets
Infrastructure
.919
Health and primary education
.847
Higher education and training
.912
Eigen Value
2.390
% Variance Explained
79.825
Cumulative% Variance Explained
79.825
KMO measure of sampling adequacy =0.713
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 6805.75; p <0.001
Note. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads
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c. Capital market development - In order to measure the level of capital market
development, twelve components were considered. These twelve components include lending
interest, market capitalization, stock market turnover, efficacy of corporate boards, auditing and
reporting standards, strength of investor protection, minority share holder protection, ease of
access to loans, soundness of banks, regulation of security exchange and effectiveness of
antimonopoly policies. Since higher interest rates are association with poorly developed capital
markets, the lending interest rate component was reverse coded. Definitions, measurement scales
and sources of data are provided in Table 9. As reported in Table 12, EFA with oblique rotation
resulted in a three factor solution with eigenvalues greater than one. The three factor solution
explained a cumulative variance of 82.48%.
Table 12
Factor Analysis Results for Capital Market Development
Factor 1Capital Market
Quality

Factor 2Capital
Market Size

Lending Interest rates(Rev Code)
−.095
.084
Z_ Market Capitalization
−.298
.966
Z_ Stock traded
−.198
.951
Efficacy of Corporate Boards
−.367
.869
Auditing and Reporting Standards
−.410
.938
Strength of investor protection
.660
−.564
Minority shareholder protection
−.308
.956
Ease of access to loans
.067
.801
Soundness of banks
−.383
.847
Regulation of security exchange
−.214
.879
Effectiveness of Antimonopoly policies
−.077
.815
Eigen Value
6.112
1.881
% Variance Explained
55.564
17.100
Cumulative% Variance Explained
55.564
72.664
KMO measure of sampling adequacy = 0.844
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity = 3657.772; p <0.001
Note. The bold font indicates the factor on which the variable loads
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Factor 3Cost of
Capital
.970
.084
.057
−.039
−.001
.241
−.030
.108
−.174
−.206
.048
1.080
9.819
82.482

The efficacy of corporate boards, auditing and reporting standards, minority share holder
protection, ease of access to loans, soundness of banks, regulation of security exchange, and
effectiveness of antimonopoly policies loaded heavily on factor 1, which represents capital
market quality. Ease of access to loans had the smallest loading of 0.80 and minority share
holder protection had the highest loading. None of the components presented any significant
cross loadings. Factor 1 i.e. capital market quality explained 55.56% of the variance.
Market capitalization and stock traded loaded heavily on factor 2 representing capital
market size. Stock traded had a loading of 0.95 and market capitalization had a loading of 0.97,
and presenting no significant cross loadings. The Capital market size factor explained a variance
of 17.10%. Lending interest rate had a loading of 0.97 on factor 3, representing the cost of
capital, while explaining 9.82% of the variance.
Control Variables. Several control variables were used in accordance to previous studies
for the respective analysis.
Acquirer public status is a dummy variable, where 1 was assigned if the acquiring firm is
a publicly-traded firm, and 0 assigned if the acquiring firm is a privately held. The source of the
data was SDC Platinum, and is a transaction-level variable.
Target public status is a dummy variable, where 1 was assigned if the target firm is a
publicly-traded firm, and 0 was assigned if the target firm is privately held. The source of the
data was SDC Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.
Deal value is a variable used to quantify the size of the acquisition measured in millions
of US dollars. Size of the deal can have an impact on the acquisition behaviors of the acquirer,
and also determines the risk involved in the given transaction. The source of the data was SDC
Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.
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Government involvement is a dummy variable that indicates whether the home or host
country has a stake in either the target firm or the acquirer firm. The source of the data was SDC
Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.
Friendly acquisition is a dummy variable which indicates that the acquirer made a
friendly offer and reached an agreement with the target without any aggressive maneuvers.
Existing research suggests that deal attitude has a significant influence on the outcome of the
transaction, and future of the target firm. 0 was assigned if the acquisition was not friendly and 1
was assigned if the focal acquisition was friendly. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and
is a transaction level variable.
Hostile acquisition is a dummy variable which indicates that the target was a subject of
hostile takeover attempts by the acquirer. 0 was assigned if the acquisition was not hostile and 1
was assigned if the focal acquisition was hostile. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and
is a transaction level variable.
Acquirer size is a variable used to quantify the value of the acquiring firm in millions of
US dollars. The value of the acquirer’s current assets was used as a proxy for acquirer size.
Acquirer current assets includes cash and other assets that will be turned into cash within one
year, which includes cash, marketable securities, accounts receivable, inventories, and prepaid
expenses. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and is a transaction-level variable.
Acquirer cash is a variable indicating the value of cash and temporary investments for
cash held by the acquirer (most current financial information) at the time of the announcement
reported in millions of US dollars. The source of the data was SDC platinum and is a transactionlevel variable.
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Joint Venture is a dummy variable indicating if the acquired organization was a joint
venture between the acquiring and the selling firm. A value of 0 was assigned if the target was
not a joint venture and 1 was assigned if the target firm was a joint venture.
Number of bidders is an ordinal variable indicating the number of entities bidding for the
target during the focal transaction. The source of the data was SDC Platinum and is a
transaction-level variable.
Deal challenged is a dummy variable which indicates if a third party launched an offer
for the target while the original bid was pending. A value of 0 was assigned if the deal was not
challenged and 1 was assigned if the deal was challenged. The source of the data was SDC
platinum and is a transaction-level variable.
Acquirer Industry was determined based on the 2 digit SIC (standard industrial
classification) code. Industries included in the analysis were construction, finance and insurance,
manufacturing, mining, services, retail and wholesale trade, transport and public administration.
Dummy variables were created for each of the industries except public administration, which
was left as a reference industry. The public administration industry had the lowest number of
transactions within the industry, therefore this industry was used as reference.
Year of announcement is a dummy variable created to avoid unobserved omitted
variable bias. Nine year dummies were created for years 2006-2014, leaving 2015 as a reference
year.
Statistical Analysis
To test the hypothesized relationship between determinants of home country environment
and equity sought, linear regression was used. Though the data is nested, interclass correlations
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were close to zero making linear regression the desirable method of analysis. This analysis was
used to test Hypotheses 5a, 5b, 5c, 8, 11a, 11b, and 11c.
To test the hypothesized relationship between determinants of the home country
environment and acquisition premium, 2 level (transaction and country level) multilevel linear
regressions was used. The interclass correlations were 0.42, which suggested that meaningful
results can be obtained by performing a multilevel regression. This analysis was used to test
Hypotheses 6a, 6b, 6c, 9, 12a, 12b, and 12c.
Finally, to test for the hypothesized relationship between determinants of home country
environment and the method of payment, 2 level (multilevel) binary logistic regressions were
used owing to the dichotomous dependent variable and nested data. With the presented an inter
class correlation of 0.50, it is suggested that meaningful results can be obtained by performing a
multilevel binary logistic regression. This analysis will test for hypotheses 7a, 7b, 7c, 10, 13a,
13b, and 13c.
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Chapter 9
Results
Table 13 presents descriptive statistics and the bivariate correlations for the entire series
of dependent, independent and control variables used to test hypothesis 5a to 13c. All
correlations were below the standard cutoff limit of 0.70. Though below the cutoff limit, high
correlations were observed between political institutions and capital market size (r = −0.62), and
between acquirer public service and acquirer cash (r = −0.64). No multicollinearity was
observed in any of the analysis (VIF<10) and maximum VIF presented was 5.47.
Table 13
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
S.no
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

ES
AP
CP
PI
RI
TI
FM
CMQ
CMS
CoC
APS
TPS
DV
GI
Friendly
Hostile
AC
AS
NoB
DC

Mean
64.57
.01
4.07
72.67
4.93
4.52
−.02
42.45
236.13
5101.68
11891.13
1.02
-

S.D.
37.40
.88
.67
10.17
4.93
4.52
.96
6.19
1183.14
5295.05
92606.49
.15
-

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

.31**
−.04*
.08**
.08**
−.03*
−.07**
.10**
−.04**
−.07**
.13**
−.32**
.06**
−.09**
.18**
.06**
−.13**
−.05**
.09**
.09**

−.19**
.13**
.06**
.01
.04**
.05**
−.05**
−.01
.17**
−.57**
−.09**
−.06**
.13**
−.16**
−.12**
.00
−.14**
−.15**

−.03*
−.03
−.02
.04**
−.02
−.02
.06**
−.04**
.17**
.03
−.02
−.06**
.08**
.02
−.01
.08**
.08**

.39**
.34**
.39**
.43**
−.62**
−.00
.18**
−.08**
−.00**
−.21
.03*
−.02
−.12**
−.04**
−.03
−.03

.11**
.21**
.15**
−.17**
.17**
.13**
−.05**
−.03
−.10**
.04**
−.02
−.11**
−.04*
−.05**
−.05**

.42**
.09**
−.12**
.22**
−.05**
−.00
.01
−.05**
−.02**
.00
.03
−.03*
−.02
−.02

.01
.03*
.41
.13
−.07**
−.01
−.01
.01
−.03
.02
−.01
−.06**
−.05

−.27**
−.13**
.15**
−.04*
−.03
−.18**
.03
−.00
−.12**
−.04*
−.02
−.02

Note.
ES: Equity Sought
AP: Acquisition Premium
CP: Contingent Payment
PI: Political Institutions
RI: Regulatory Institutions
TI: Trade Institutions
**
p < 0.01. *p < 0.05

APS: Acquirer Public Status
TPS: Target Public Status
DV: Deal Value
GI: Government Involvement
AC: Acquirer Cash
AS: Acquirer Size
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Table 13 (Continued)
Descriptive Statistics and Bivariate Correlations
S.no
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

CoC
APS
TPS
DV
GI
Friendly
Hostile
AC
AS
NoB
DC

9
.22**
−.08**
−.04*
.01
.09**
.03
.02
.06**
.00
−.01
−.01

10

11

12

13

14

15

−.08**
−.00
−.11**
. 09**
−.00
−.04*
.00
−.02
−.05**
−.05**

−.21**
.02
−.21**
.04*
.02
−.64**
.03*
−.04**
−.04**

.07**
.11**
−.12**
.13**
.19**
.07**
.12**
.13**

.08**
−.08**
.23**
.02
.02
.19**
.21**

−.01
−.01
.19**
.05**
.03*
.04*

−.35**
−.06**
−.01
−.09**
−.11**

Note.
FM: Factor Markets
CMQ: Capital Market Quality
CMS: Capital Market Size
**
p < 0.01. *p < 0.05

16

.00
−.00
.29**
.33**

17

18

.14**
.02
.02

−.00
−.00

19

.94**

NoB: Number of Bidders
DC: Deal Challenged
CoC: Cost of Capital

The results of the regression analysis performed to test for the hypothesized relationship
between home country environment and equity sought are presented in Table 14. Model 1
represents the regression equation with control variables including year and acquirer industry
dummies. Model 1 alone explains 15% of the variance in equity sought. Year 2011 (b = 6.02,
p<0.05), year 2013 (b = −6.63, p<0.05), construction (b = −33.76, p<0.01), finance (b =
−27.61, p<0.05), manufacturing (b = −22.18, p<0.05), mining (b = −29.37, p<0.05), services
(b = 19.99, p<0.05), trade (b = −22.89, p<0.05), transport (b = 29.82, p<0.01), investor group
(b = −32.59, p<0.01), target public status(b = −24.63, p<0.05), hostile acquisitions(b = 33.17,
p<0.01), deal size(β = 0.00, p<0.05), and acquirer size (β = −0.00, p<0.05) were significant.
Model 2 tests for the role of country’s institutions on equity sought. In Model 2, political
institutions, regulatory institutions, and trade institutions were entered into the regression
equation in addition to the control variables listed in Model 1. Model 2 explains 16% of the
variance (adj- R2 = 0.16), as political institutions (b = 1.56, p<0.05) and regulatory institutions
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Table 14
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Equity Sought
Variables
Controls

Constant
Year 2006 Dummy
Year 2007 Dummy
Year 2008 Dummy
Year 2009 Dummy
Year 2010 Dummy
Year 2011 Dummy
Year 2012 Dummy
Year 2013 Dummy
Year 2014 Dummy
Construction Dummy
Finance Dummy
Investor Group
Manufacturing
Mining
Services
Trade
Transport
Acquirer Public Status
Target Public Status
Govt. Involvement
Hostile Acquisition
Deal Value
Acquirer Cash
Acquirer Size

Model 1
b (s. e.)
99.68 (2.49)
.64 (2.27)
6.48 (2.22)
5.32 (2.54)
2.52 (2.33)
3.32 (2.33)
6.02* (2.11)
−.13 (2.52)
−6.63* (2.37)
−2.65 (9.86)
−33.76** (8.25)
−27.61** (8.21)
−32.59** (8.04)
−22.18* (8.15)
−29.37** (8.15)
−19.99* (8.43)
−22.89* (8.30)
−29.82** (1.62)
−1.13 (1.36)
−24.63** (2.26)
−6.33 (3.58)
33.17** (.00)
.00* (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.00** (.00)

Independent

1.56* (.83)
2.06* (1.01)
−.13†(.06)

Political Institutions
Regulatory Institutions
Trade Institutions
Factor Markets
Capital Market Quality
Capital Market Size
Cost of Capital
R-Squared
F-Stats
Note .**p<0.01. *p<0.05.†p<0.10. n = 4161

Model 2
b (s. e.)
100.67 (10.65)
−2.12 (2.60)
4.73 (2.37)
3.65 (2.29)
1.54 (2.54)
2.67 (2.35)
5.53* (2.36)
−.67 (2.11)
−7.03* (2.52)
−2.80 (2.34)
−.32.74** (9.69)
−26.67** (7.98)
−31.73** (7.92)
−21.19* (7.78)
−27.84** (7.90)
−19.73* (7.89)
−21.67* (8.18)
−28.83** (8.06)
−1.88 (1.64)
−24.51** (1.37)
−5.61 (2.16)
33.48** (3.68)
.00* (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.00** (.00)

.15
34.91**
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.16
31.66**

Table 14 (Continued)
Results of Hierarchical Regression Analysis for Equity Sought
Variables
Controls

Constant
Year 2006 Dummy
Year 2007 Dummy
Year 2008 Dummy
Year 2009 Dummy
Year 2010 Dummy
Year 2011 Dummy
Year 2012 Dummy
Year 2013 Dummy
Year 2014 Dummy
Construction Dummy
Finance Dummy
Investor Group
Manufacturing
Mining
Services
Trade
Transport
Acquirer Public Status
Target Public Status
Govt. Involvement
Hostile Acquisition
Deal Value
Acquirer Cash
Acquirer Size

Independent
Political Institutions
Regulatory Institutions
Trade Institutions
Factor Markets
Capital Market Quality
Capital Market Size
Cost of Capital

Model 3
b (s. e.)
130.81 (11.12)
−3.28 (2.64)
1.95 (2.36)
.65 (2.31)
−1.20 (2.57)
1.31 (2.33)
5.03* (2.33)
−.94 (2.08)
−7.61* (2.48)
−2.18 (2.34)
−31.29** (9.93)
−24.25** (8.10)
−29.42** (8.07)
−18.36* (7.90)
−28.15** (8.02)
−18.07* (7.99)
−18.95* (8.28)
−26.26** (8.17)
−1.79 (1.66)
−24.23** (1.36)
−4.06 (2.24)
32.54** (3.73)
.00* (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.00** (.00)

Model 4
b (s. e.)
128.74 (14.26)
−1.63 (2.96)
3.25 (2.74)
1.99 (2.79)
.06 (2.76)
2.55 (2.68)
6.27* (2.81)
.47 (2.51)
−6.27* (2.81)
−1.21 (2.44)
−31.09** (9.84)
−23.98** (7.95)
−29.23** (7.93)
−18.25* (7.74)
−28.11** (7.87)
−17.85* (7.84)
−18.83* (8.13)
−26.07** (8.02)
−1.88 (1.65)
−24.23** (1.35)
−3.81† (2.27)
32.32** (3.74)
.00* (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.00** (.00)

3.23** (.82)
2.79** (1.03)
.00 (.06)
−8.93** (1.32)

3.77** (1.17)
1.76 (2.04)
.00 (.06)
−8.84** (1.54)
1.43 (2.54)
1.03 (1.14)
-.06 (.12)
.17
31.54**

.17
R-Squared
34.68**
F-Stats
Note.**p<0.01. *p<0.05 .†p<0.10. n = 4161
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(b = 2.06, p<0.05) where both positive and significant, lending support to Hypotheses 5a and 5b.
Trade institutions (b = −0.13, p<0.10) had a negative and significant effect which failed to
support the hypothesized relationship in Hypothesis 5c.
Model 3 tests for the role of the home country’s factor market endowment and explains
17% of the variance. Though factor markets (b = −8.93, p<0.01) had a significant effect, it was
negative which is different from the hypothesized relationship in Hypothesis 8. Model 4 tests for
the role of the home country’s capital market development explaining 18% (adj. R2 = 0.18) of
the variance. All three components, capital market quality (b = 1.43, p>0.05), capital market
size (b = 1.03, p>0.05) and cost of capital (b = −0.06, p>0.05) were insignificant.
Results of the 2 level HLM analysis performed to test for the hypothesized relationship
between home country environment and acquisition premium are presented in Table 15. Model 1
tests for the effects of transaction level control variables along with industry and year dummies.
In Model 1, year 2006 (b = −0.01, p<0.01), 2007(b = 0.25, p<0.05), 2008 (b = 0.11, p<0.05),
2009 (b = 0.15, p<0.05) and 2010 (b = 0.15, p<0.01) had significant effects. Acquirer public
status (b = 0.11, p<0.01) was positive and significant, while target public status (b = −1.12,
p<0.01) was negative and significant. Number of bidders (b = −0.42, p<.0.01), deal value (b =
−0.00, p<0.05) and hostile acquisitions (b = −0.75, p<0.01) had negative and significant effects,
while equity sought (b = 0.00, p<0.01), acquirer cash (b = 0 .00, p<0.01), and acquirer size (b
= 0.00, p<0.01) had positive and significant effects.
Model 2 tested for the effects of country-level institutional variables, namely political,
regulatory and trade institutions. Political (b = 0.11, p<0.05) and regulatory (b = 0.04, p<0.10)
institutions had positive and significant effect as hypothesized and lending support to Hypotheses
6a and 6b. Trade institutions (b = −0.00, p>0.05) while slightly negative, was not significant,
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Table 15
Results of HLM Analysis of Acquisition Premium

Constant
Controls
Transaction level

2006(β01j)
2007(β02j)
2008(β03j)
2009(β04j)
2010(β05j)
2011(β06j)
2012(β07j)
2013(β08j)
2014(β09j)
2015(β10j)
Construction Ind. (β11j)
Finance Ind. (β12j)
Investor Group (β13j)
Manufacturing Ind(β14j)
Services Ind(β15j)
Trade Ind (β16j)
Transport Ind(β17j)
Acq Public(β18j)
Tgt Public(β19j)
Joint Venture(β20j)
Govt Invl(β21j)
No. of Bidders(β22j)
Friendly(β23j)
Hostile(β24j)
Equity Sought(β25j)
Deal Value(β26j)
Acq. Cash(β27j)
Acq. Size(β28j)
Independent
Pol Inst. (γ01j)
Country level
Regul Inst. (γ02j)
Trade Inst. (γ03j)
Factor Market(γ04j)
Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)
Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)
Cost of Capital(γ07j)
Wald χ2
**
*
Note. p<0.01. p<0.05.†p<0.10. n = 4161
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Model 1
b (s.e.)
4.24 (.41)
−.01** (.06)
.25* (.05)
.11* (.06)
.15* (.06)
.15** (.06)
.20 (.06)
.08 (.05)
−.00 (.06)
.01 (.06)
−.31 (.41)
−.48 (.39)
−.43 (.39)
.40 (.38)
−.55 (.39)
−.40 (.39)
−.42 (.39)
−.41 (.39)
.11** (.04)
−1.12** (.03)
.65** (.11)
.04 (.04)
−.42** (.09)
.01 (.05)
−.75 ** (.15)
.00 ** (.00)
−.00 *(.00)
.00 **(.00)
.00 **(.00)

Model 2
b (s.e.)
4.55 (.43)
−.05** (.07)
.22* (.06)
.07* (.06)
.09* (.06)
.11** (.06)
.16 (.05)
.04 (.05)
−.03 (.06)
−.03 (.06)
−.33 (.42)
−.53 (.39)
−.46 (.39)
−.43 (.39)
−.58 (.39)
−.44 (.39)
−.45 (.39)
−.45 (.39)
.09** (.04)
−1.11** (.03)
.63** (.11)
.09 (.11)
−.41** (.09)
.01 (.05)
−.74** (.15)
.00** (.00)
−.00* (.00)
.00** (.00)
.00** (.00)
.11* (.02)
.04† (.02)
−.00 (.00)

2284.97**

2326.80**

Table 15 (Continued)
Results of HLM Analysis of Acquisition Premium
Model 3
b (s.e.)
4.57 (.45)
−.05** (.06)
.21* (.05)
.06* (.05)
.09* (.06)
.10** (.05)
.16 (.05)
.04 (.05)
−.03 (.06)
−.02 (.05)
−.33 (.41)
−.52 (.38)
−.45 (.38)
−.43 (.38)
−.58 (.38)
−.44 (.38)
−.45 (.39)
−.45 (.39)
.09** (.04)
−1.11** (.03)
.63** (.11)
.09 (.04)
−.41** (.09)
.01 (.05)
−.74** (.14)
.00** (.00)
−.00* (.00)
.00** (.00)
.00** (.00)
.11* (.02)
.04† (.02)
−.00 (.00)
−.01 (.03)

Constant
Controls
Transaction level

2006(β01j)
2007(β02j)
2008(β03j)
2009(β04j)
2010(β05j)
2011(β06j)
2012(β07j)
2013(β08j)
2014(β09j)
2015(β10j)
Construction Ind. (β11j)
Finance Ind. (β12j)
Investor Group (β13j)
Manufacturing Ind(β14j)
Services Ind(β15j)
Trade Ind (β16j)
Transport Ind(β17j)
Acq Public(β18j)
Tgt Public(β19j)
Joint Venture(β20j)
Govt Invl(β21j)
No. of Bidders(β22j)
Friendly(β23j)
Hostile(β24j)
Equity Sought(β25j)
Deal Value(β26j)
Acq. Cash(β27j)
Acq. Size(β28j)
Independent
Pol Inst. (γ01j)
Country level
Regul Inst. (γ02j)
Trade Inst. (γ03j)
Factor Market(γ04j)
Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)
Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)
Cost of Capital(γ07j)
Wald χ2
**
*
Note. p<0.01. p<0.05. †p<0.10. n = 4161

2326.90**
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Model 4
b (s.e.)
4.98 (.59)
.02** (.14)
.33* (.13)
.19* (.13)
.19* (.13)
.24** (.13)
.31 (.13)
.18 (.13)
.13 (.14)
.19 (.14)
−.42 (.48)
−.69 (.45)
−.59 (.45)
−.57 (.45)
−.71 (.45)
−.58 (.45)
−.63 (.46)
−.61 (.45)
.11** (.04)
−1.06** (.03)
.65** (.11)
.09 (.05)
−.41** (.10)
.04 (.06)
−.75** (.17)
.01** (.00)
−.00* (.00)
.00** (.00)
.00** (.00)
.09* (.03)
.09† (.06)
−.00 (.00)
−.05 (.04)
−.18* (.08)
−.11† (.06)
−.00 (.00)
1716.61**

therefore, Hypothesis 6c was not supported. Similarly Model 3 tested for the effects of country
level factor markets (b = −0.01, p>.05), which while negative, was not significant, therefore,
Hypothesis 9 was not supported.
Model 4 tested for the effects of the country level variables of the capital market
development dimensions, namely capital market quality, capital market size and cost of capital.
Capital market quality (b = −0.18, p<0.05) and capital market size (b = −0.11, p<0.10) had
negative and significant effects as hypothesized, lending support to Hypotheses 12a and 12b.
Cost of capital (b = 0.00, p>0.05) while negative, was not significant; therefore, Hypothesis 12c
was not supported.
Results of the (2 level) multilevel logistic regression analysis performed to test for the
hypothesized relationship between the home country environment and the method of payment are
presented in Table 16. Model 1 reports on the effects of transaction level (level 1) control
variables, year and industry dummies. Years 2006 (b = 0.66, p<0.10), 2011(b = 0.79, p<0.05),
2012 (b = 0.72, p<0.05), 2013(b = 0.66, p<0.05), and 2014 (b = 0.89, p<0.05) had positive and
significant effects on contingent method of payment. Target public status (b = 0.73, p<0.01) and
number of bidders (b = 0.79, p<0.01) had positive and significant effects, while government
involvement (b = −0.36, p<0.01), friendly acquisitions (b = −0.22, p<0.05), equity sought (b =
−0.00, p<0.10), and deal value (b = −0.00, p<0.10) had negative and significant effects.
Model 2 presents the effects of country level (level 2) institutional variables, namely
political, regulatory and trade institutions, which were not significant. Therefore, hypotheses 7a,
7b and 7c were not supported. Similarly, Model 3 presents the effects of factor markets which
were not significant. Therefore, Hypothesis 10 was not supported.
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Table 16
Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of Contingent Method of Payment

Constant
Controls
Transaction level
Level 1

2006(β01j)
2007(β02j)
2008(β03j)
2009(β04j)
2010(β05j)
2011(β06j)
2012(β07j)
2013(β08j)
2014(β09j)
2015(β10j)
Construction Ind. (β11j)
Finance Ind. (β12j)
Investor Group (β13j)
Manufacturing Ind(β14j)
Services Ind(β15j)
Trade Ind (β16j)
Transport Ind(β17j)
Acq Public(β18j)
Tgt Public(β19j)
Govt Invl(β20j)
No. of Bidders(β21j)
Friendly(β22j)
Hostile(β23j)
Equity Sought(β24j)
Deal Value(β25j)
Acq. Cash(β26j)
Acq. Size(β27j)
Pol Inst. (γ01j)
Independent
Regul Inst. (γ02j)
Country level
Level 2
Trade Inst. (γ03j)
Factor Market(γ04j)
Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)
Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)
Cost of Capital(γ07j)
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
Note. **p<0.01. *p<0.05. †p<0.10 . n = 4161
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Model 1
b (s.e.)
−2.68 (1.19)
.66† (.15)
.33 (.14)
.25 (.14)
.41 (.15)
.47 (.14)
.79* (.14)
.72* (.13)
.66* (.15)
.89* (.14)
.19 (1.20)
.66 (1.15)
.78 (1.15)
.70 (1.15)
.68 (1.15)
.54 (1.15)
.55 (1.16)
.49 (1.15)
−.02 (.09)
.73** (.07)
−.36** (.10)
.79** (.26)
−.22* (.13)
.74 (.41)
−.00† (.00)
−.00† (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.00 (.00)

Model 2
b (s.e.)
−1.87 (1.34)
.58† (.17)
.29 (.14)
.22 (.14)
.39 (.15)
.48 (.14)
.78* (.14)
.73* (.13)
.66* (.15)
.89* (.14)
.23(1.20)
.68(1.15)
.79(1.15)
.72(1.15)
.69(1.15)
.55(1.15)
.57(1.16)
.50(1.15)
−.02(.09)
.72** (.07)
−.36** (.10)
.79(.27)
−.22* (.13)
.74(.41)
−.00† (.00)
−.00† (.00)
−.00(.00)
−.00(.00)
−.11(.11)
−.03(.08)
−.01(.00)

212.92**
−2650.83

216.45**
-2647.32

Table 16 (Continued)
Results of Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis of Contingent Method of Payment
Model 3
b (s.e.)
−1.98 (1.46)
.58† (.18)
.31 (.15)
.23 (.16)
.41 (.16)
.48 (.15)
.79* (.14)
.73* (.13)
.66* (.15)
.89* (.14)
.23 (1.20)
.68 (1.15)
.79 (1.15)
.72 (1.15)
.69 (1.15)
.55 (1.15)
.57 (1.16)
.50 (1.15)
−.02 (.09)
.72** (.07)
−.36** (.10)
.79 (.27)
−.22* (.13)
.74 (.41)
.00† (.00)
.00† (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.11 (.11)
−.03 (.09)
−.01 (.00)
.03 (.16)

Constant
Controls
Transaction level
Level 1

2006(β01j)
2007(β02j)
2008(β03j)
2009(β04j)
2010(β05j)
2011(β06j)
2012(β07j)
2013(β08j)
2014(β09j)
2015(β10j)
Construction Ind. (β11j)
Finance Ind. (β12j)
Investor Group (β13j)
Manufacturing Ind(β14j)
Services Ind(β15j)
Trade Ind (β16j)
Transport Ind(β17j)
Acq Public(β18j)
Tgt Public(β19j)
Govt Invl(β20j)
No. of Bidders(β21j)
Friendly(β22j)
Hostile(β23j)
Equity Sought(β24j)
Deal Value(β25j)
Acq. Cash(β26j)
Acq. Size(β27j)
Pol Inst. (γ01j)
Independent
Regul Inst. (γ02j)
Country level
Level 2
Trade Inst. (γ03j)
Factor Market(γ04j)
Cap Mkt Quality(γ05j)
Cap. Mkt Size(γ06j)
Cost of Capital(γ07j)
Wald χ2
Log likelihood
**
*
Note. p<0.01. p<0.05. †p<0.10. n = 4161

216.60**
-2647.31

79

Model 4
b (s.e.)
−4.39 (1.72)
.67† (.36)
.44 (.35)
.24 (.35)
.50 (.35)
.48 (.35)
.77* (.34)
.76* (.34)
.69* (.35)
.85* (.35)
.07 (1.24)
.39 (1.18)
.52 (1.18)
.52 (1.18)
.54 (1.18)
.38 (1.18)
.49 (1.19)
.36 (1.18)
−.07 (.11)
.56** (.08)
−.43** (.11)
.74** (.27)
−.34* (.14)
.71 (.47)
.00† (.00)
.00† (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.00 (.00)
−.13 (.12)
−.38 (.19)
−.01 (.00)
.28 (.19)
.43* (.21)
−.12 (.19)
.02* (.01)
130.87**
-2110.33

Model 4 presents the effects of capital market development via its three components.
Capital market quality had a positive and significant effect, while capital market size was not
significant. Finally, the cost of capital had a positive and significant effect as hypothesized.
Therefore, Hypotheses 13a and 13c were supported, while Hypotheses 13b was unsupported.
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Chapter 10
Discussion
Emerging markets and emerging market firms (EMFs) have progressed greatly since the
inception of the emerging market concept. Both play a prominent role in today’s global economy
and are challenging the status quo of dominant market players from advanced markets. The
growing standing of emerging markets and EMFs are not only challenging other market players,
but are also challenging the theoretical understanding of firm behavior with respect to
internationalization. In an attempt to enhance the understanding of EMF behavior, IB researchers
took distinct approaches, like attempting to explain EMF behavior using existing theories,
proposing new theories or by amending existing theories to apply to a broader set of firms. In
doing so, researchers (except a few: e.g., Hoskisson et al., 2000, 2013) have created a
dichotomous division between EMFs and AMFs, where there is an underlying treatment of
homogeneity in the behavior of EMFs.
In this dissertation I argued that emerging markets are far from homogenous. In fact,
EMFs are heterogeneous at the very least because of the effects of heterogeneous home country
institutions and resource environments. Hence, current research that focuses primarily on the
behavior of EMFs from a few countries such as China and South Korea (Kim, Hoskisson, & Lee,
2015; Mathews, 2006) cannot be generalized to all EMFs. I also demonstrate that the distinct
behavior of EMFs can be better understood by focusing on the country of origin and those
countries’ respective institutional and resource configurations. The institution and resources
create the context from which EMFs are motivated to internationalize. In doing so, this two-part
study integrates the ‘OLI paradigm’ with the three specialized theoretical strands (the escape
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motivation, non-market capabilities and strategic asset seeking views) built on the home
country’s institutional and resource environments.
The findings in this dissertation underscore the role of the home country influence by
emphasizing the importance of a country’s institutional and resource environments. A framework
(presented in Figure 3) to interpret EMF behavior as a function of home country influence was
created in this dissertation which identifies home country institutions as a source of motivation
for internationalization. The framework also presents factor market development as a source of
EMF capabilities to capitalize and accrue the benefits of internationalization to advanced
markets. Additionally, it also finds that home country capital markets are indicators of a
country’s capacity to export capital. Finally, technological readiness is also an indicator of
emerging markets’ and EMFs’ adaptability to advanced market technologies.

Figure 3. Conceptual Framework to Understand Home Country Influence
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By focusing on a broader set of emerging markets, the analysis of OFDI scale directed
from emerging markets to advanced markets provides evidence suggesting that institutional and
resource environments have significant effects on EMF internationalization trajectories. The
findings suggest that the qualities of emerging market political institutions, factor markets,
technological readiness, and capital market size act as facilitators to drive FDI towards advanced
markets. However, the development of economic institutions curbs or constrains the flow of
OFDI towards advanced markets. This constraining finding was contrary to the hypothesized
relationship and cannot be explained at this time. Therefore, future research should be directed
towards advancing our understudying the differentiated and complex nature of institutions.
Results further suggest that development in emerging market home country institutional
and resource environments play a critical role in determining the firm level strategies in cross
border acquisitions into advanced markets. Evidence from the analysis suggests that growing
institutional quality in home countries will drive EMFs to pursue larger equity stakes and greater
control of targets in advanced markets. However, home country factor market development
works to the contrary. Evidence suggests that increases in home factor market development
drives EMFs to pursue smaller equity stakes, and favor partial acquisitions over full acquisitions.
This may be understood as the concept that EMFs with well-endowed factor markets at home are
capable of benefitting from partial acquisitions. In short, the EMFs in such conditions are also
capable of sourcing capabilities from the target firm even when the acquirer does not assume
100% equity. Similarly, EMFs are motivated by the added value an AMF acquisition can create
to their own firm. Given the home country institutional environment, EMFs are willing to pay
higher premiums to acquire advanced market targets. In addition, these results also suggest that
as the home country capital markets develop, the ability of EMFs to pay higher premiums
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decreases due to increases in shareholder protection and other regulatory constraints that are
placed on the firms in the home country. Also, the tendency to use contingent methods of
payment also increases with development of home country capital markets largely due to a
decrease in tolerance for risk and greater acceptability of the acquirer stock by the target firm.
Conclusion and Contributions
The findings of this dissertation are to be interpreted as follows. First, with the
development of the home country institutional environment, EMFs are motivated to shift their
focus from non-market capabilities to market capabilities and to acquire and internalize market
capabilities. When this occurs, EMFs are motivated to internationalize to advanced markets to
augment strategic assets that they traditionally lack. Thus, home country institutional
development acts as a motivator in driving EMF investments to advanced markets in pursuit of
market capabilities.
Second, EMFs should have sufficient home country advantage with resource munificence
in form of factor market development and technological readiness, where factor markets
determines their capability to internalize advanced market firm capabilities with ease and the
technological readiness determines the adaptability of EMFs to advanced market technological
capabilities and internalize them.
Finally, the capital market development determines the capacity of emerging markets and
respective emerging market firms to export capital. The capacity to export capital, in turn,
determines their ability to pursue asset augmentation through advanced market internalization.
All in all, EMFs are subjects of their home country institutional and resource environment, and
understanding the state of the home country environment helps predicts and understand EMF
behavior.
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This dissertation also contributes to international business and strategy literature in
several ways. First, this dissertation made an attempt to integrate existing theoretical strands
(non-market capabilities, resource seeking perspective, and refuge seeking perspectives) that
emerged to explain behaviors of EMFs. Though these theoretical strands are important tools to
understand a subset of EMFs, they cannot explain the behavior of most EMFs. In order to have a
holistic framework that explains the behavior of most EMFs, an attempt was made to integrate
all three strands with the OLI paradigm, which helps to explain the behavior of most firms.
Second, in order to make the framework more effective in understanding EMF
internationalization, differences among emerging markets were highlighted in the form of
institutional and resource heterogeneity. As a first step towards developing the integrated
framework, this dissertation studies the influence of home country environment. Finally, this
dissertation contributes by providing empirical evidence highlighting the influence of home
country institutional and resource environment on international trajectories and
internationalization behaviors of EMFs.
Implications
The findings of this dissertation have several research and practical implications. First,
current research of emerging markets and EMFs which assume the generalizability of findings
from a few emerging markets to all EMFs is very problematic. Findings from this dissertation
imply that the heterogeneity in emerging markets’ institutional and resource environment have
important implications on EMF behaviors. These findings are consistent with limited research in
this area (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Kedia, Reddy, & Bilgili, 2015; Wan, 2005). Second, the
findings of this dissertation imply that much EMF behavior can be greatly understood by country
of origin effects, also reinforcing findings in earlier research (Luo & Wang, 2012). Third, the
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disparity in the value created by the advanced markets acquisitions for AMFs and EMFs can
explain the reluctance of AMFs to bid higher and conversely, the willingness of EMFs to bid
higher than AMFs. The failure of AMFs to successfully restrict EMFs from acquiring firms in
advanced markets will cost AMFs in two fronts. First, granting access to traditional ownership
advantages via advanced market acquisitions will undermine the strategic advantages that AMFs
have over EMFs in both advanced markets and emerging markets. Second, advanced markets
acquisitions also grant market access to EMFs which will allow the EMFs to effectively compete
against AMFs. In such cases the ownership advantage disparity will be nullified.
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